Archiv für das Jahr: 2005

Über die neue Schell-Edition

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Besprochen von Leif Allendorf

  • Maximilian Schell Jubiläums Edition. Die preisgekrönten Film-Regiearbeiten. Eurovideo, 374 Min, EUR 34,99. Enthält: Erste Liebe (1970), Der Fußgänger (1973), Der Richter und sein Henker (1975), Geschichten aus dem Wiener Wald (1979). Mit Birgit Doll u.a.

Maximilian Schell, der 2005 seinen 75. Geburtstag feierte, ist für zwei Karrieren bekannt. Ersten Ruhm errang der Österreicher als international gefragter Schauspieler und Frauenschwarm der Nachkriegszeit. In jüngster Zeit machte Schell sich als Dokumentarfilmer einen Namen. So porträtierte er zwei Frauen, die im Alter zu Schatten ihres Ruhmes wurden: Marlene Dietrich und seine Schwester Maria Schell.

Dazwischen liegt eine nicht weniger spannende Erfolgsgeschichte. Für seine erste Regiearbeit, die 1970 gedrehte Turgenjew-Adaption „Erste Liebe“ erhielt Schell drei Oscar-Nominierungen. Sein nächster Spielfilm, „Der Fußgänger“ von 1973 bekam Dutzende internationaler Preise, unter anderen den Golden Globe. Dürrenmatts „Der Richter und sein Henker“, und Horváths „Geschichten aus dem Wiener Wald“ folgten 1975 und 1979.

Ein Stück Film- und Zeitgeschichte

Nun ist bei Eurovideo eine Gesamtausgabe der genannten vier Spielfilme auf zwei DVDs erschienen, die Gelegenheit bieten, sich ein Stück Zeit- und Filmgeschichte noch einmal anzusehen. Dabei steht Zeitgemäßes neben Unzeitgemäßem. So ist das Drama „Der Fußgänger“ mit seine Schwere und Langatmigkeit heutzutage kaum mehr zu ertragen. All diese Debatten um Schuld und Sühne jener Unternehmer der Adenauerzeit, die in Verbrechen des NS-Regimes verstrickt waren, sind in den vergangenen drei, vier Jahrzehnten ausgiebig geführt worden. Für eine Überraschung sorgt in diesem Film nur der revolutionäre 68er-Sprößling, der seinen Nazi-Vater von aller Schuld freispricht, mit der Begründung: „Ich habe es sat, immer der Sohn eines bösen Nazis zu sein.“ Statdessen will er lieber gegen den Vietnam-Krieg der Amerikaner protestieren. Dass diese auch schon die Gegner des Vaters waren, schwingt hier leise mit. Dies wirkt wie eine gruselige Vorwegnahme des Spaziergangs von Ronald Reagen mit Bundeskanzler Kohl über die SS-Soldatengräber von Bitburg. Damals, 1985, signalisierte der US-Präsident, die deutschen Wehrmachtssoldaten seien ja eigentlich auf der richtigen Seite gewesen – schließlich hätten sie die Kommunisten bekämpft.

Prominent besetzter Thriller statt Europudding

Ganz und gar zeitgemäß dagegen wirkt die Dürrenmatt-Verfilmung „Der Richter und sein Henker“. Dass dieser Streifen mit Jaqueline Bisset und Martin Shaw (nicht zu vergessen Donald Sutherland als Leiche) nicht zum Europudding wurde, verdankt er den schrulligen Hauptpersonen. Wenn Kommissar Bärlach (Martin Rit) und sein Assistent Tschanz (heute nicht wiederzuerkennen: Jon Voight) sich gegenseitig die Bälle zuwerfen, ist das so frisch und neu wie Frotzeleien der heutigen „Tatort“-Polizisten Leitmayer und Batic.

Einen schönen Gegensatz bieten auch das älteste und das jüngste Werk des Spielfilmregisseurs Schell. „Erste Liebe“ ist ein in jeder Hinsicht schöner Film. Er ist leise, melancholisch und zeigt die Unzulänglichkeit des Menschen wie mit einem Weichzeichner. Die Horváth-Verfilmung von 1979 ist – dem österreichischen Dramatiker getreu – eine zynische Abrechnung mit den letzten präfaschistischen Jahren der Alpenrepublik.

Filme mit Gefühl. Regisseurin Noémi Lvovsky im Gespräch mit Caroline Elias und Thomas Weber, 19.12.05

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Wie haben Sie ihren ersten Film finanziert?

Bei meinem ersten Film hatte ich unglaubliches Glück. Ich konnte ihn ohne Exposé und Drehbuch beginnen, was wirklich selten ist. Ich hatte vorher einen Kurzfilm gedreht, der auf zahlreichen Festivals gelaufen war und großen Anklang gefunden hatte. Es war ein unglaublicher Zufall: Einmal wurde direkt davor ein Film von Jean-Luc Godard gezeigt, den ich nicht kannte und den ich im Übrigen bis heute nicht kenne. Er meinen Kurzfilm gesehen, sprach mit seinem Produzenten und empfahl ihm, diesen Film zu produzieren. Der Produzent sah sich den Film an und wollte mich kennen lernen. Da war ich noch an der Schule, in der Drehbuchklasse, und ich war überhaupt noch nicht sicher, ob ich selber drehen will, und in diesem Moment kam der Produzent und fragte mich, ob er meinen ersten Spielfilm produzieren dürfte. Das war eine enorme Chance, denn ich war noch recht jung, gerade 25. Hinzu kam, dass Jean-Luc Godard sich für den Film einsetzte, was ihm ein großes Gewicht verlieh.

Gab es bei diesem Film nie größere Differenzen zwischen Ihnen, der jungen Filmemacherin, und einem Vertreter der Nouvelle Vague?

Natürlich gab es die, denn die Filmemacher der Nouvelle Vague sind eine spezielle Generation. Man kann sie mit uns überhaupt nicht vergleichen. Es gibt in Frankreich viele Filmemacher und Produzenten, die die Nouvelle Vague nicht mögen – aber das ist nicht mein Fall. Ich erkenne bei den Vertretern der Nouvelle Vague viel wieder, also bei François Truffaut, Godard oder Rohmer.

Wie war die Resonanz auf Ihre Filme in Frankreich?

Meine ersten beiden Filme wurden sehr gut aufgenommen von der Kritik, dadurch hatten sie auch ein größeres Publikum, aber ich habe nie einen Produzenten kennen gelernt, der allein wegen mir Geld verdient hätte. Aber mein Film war das, was die Produzenten einen „populären Erfolg“ nennen.

Gab es auch kritische Stimmen?

Ja, sicher. Nicht direkt, aber natürlich gab es so etwas. Die Kritik mag es ja, einem Etiketten aufzukleben und auf einmal wird man darüber definiert, dass der Film 1,3 Mio. Zuschauer hatte, trotzdem er noch ein Autorenfilm ist.

Haben Sie eine besondere Arbeitsweise?

Ich weiß nicht, ob es da eine bestimmte Arbeitsweise gibt. Auf jeden Fall, brauche ich immer viel Zeit für Proben mit den Schauspielern. Solange wie möglich, zwei, drei Monate, im Durchschnitt zwei bis drei Stunden am Tag besprechen und wiederholen wir die Szenen. Und das sind Wiederholungen am Tisch, d.h. wir lesen das Drehbuch immer wieder und sprechen darüber. Das ist eine Art, es kennen zu lernen und uns kennen zu lernen. Beim Dreh selbst kann man dann viel spontaner arbeiten. Ich erwarte von den Schauspielern, dass sie mir etwas anbieten für die Szene. Ich dirigiere sie ein wenig und ich schaue mir das mit dem Kameramann an. Und dann entscheiden der Kameramann und ich, wie wir die Szene aufnehmen und schneiden werden.

Wie bringen Sie die Emotionen der Figuren zum Ausdruck?

Nun, man muss den Zustand der Figur und den der Szene zusammenbringen. Wenn man während der Vorbereitungsphase über Gefühle spricht, kann man sie analysieren, man kann versuchen, sie zu verstehen. Am Set aber geht es nicht mehr darum, zu analysieren, sondern dann ist es nötig, sich in diesen Zustand zu versetzen. Also spreche ich mit den Schauspielern über ihre Gefühle, aber ohne große Worte zu machen, das können eher Gesten sein. Das ist eine sehr körperliche Arbeit!

Welche Rolle spielt die Musik in Ihren Arbeiten?

Musik war immer sehr wichtig für mich. Sie ist meist mit den Figuren verbunden. Ich habe oft Figuren, die gerne tanzen oder singen. Oder ich setze einen Chor ein wie z.B. in Les Sentiments.

Das Gespräch führten Caroline Elias und Dr. Thomas Weber am 3.5.2005 in Babelsberg im Rahmen der Reihe „Mit Frankreich am Set“. Danke an HFF, Institut Français, Mediaoffice und das MAE. Übersetzung: Dörte Richter

Les Sentiments, Frankreich 2003. 90 Min. Regie: Noemi Lvovsky. Buch: Noemi Lvovsky, Florence Seyvos. Darsteller: Nathalie Baye, Jean-Pierre Bacri, Isabelle Carré u.a.

Neumann, Miriam: Kopftuch und Geheimpolizei. Über Marjane Satrapis politischer Comic ‚Persepolis‘, 30.11.05

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Wir haben ihren Geschichten – mehr oder weniger interessiert – zugehört. Nun ist es an der Zeit, den so genannten jungen deutschen Popliteraten und ihren noch seichteren Geschwistern, den Zonenkindern, die Tür zu weisen. In einer Zeit, in der unter dem Stichwort des Antiterrorkampfes täglich schwerste Verstöße gegen Grund- und Menschenrechte begangen werden und das Beherrschen der arabischen Sprache in Verbindung mit dem Tragen von Bart oder Kopftuch bereits als höchst verdächtig gelten kann, sollten wir junge Autoren zu Wort kommen lassen, deren Lebensweg einen Einblick in die Vielfalt islamischer Lebenswelten gewährt.

Marjane Satrapi, 1969 geboren und in Teheran aufgewachsen, hat im Jahr 2000 (Erscheinungsjahr der deutschsprachigen Ausgabe: 2004) den ersten Teil einer Comic-Autobiographie vorgelegt, in der sie anhand ihrer eigenen „kleinen“ eine wirklich große Geschichte erzählt. Motiviert wurde Satrapi dabei v.a. durch verschiedenste Vorurteile gegenüber ihrem Heimatland, die der Künstlerin in ihrer Wahlheimat Frankreich entgegenschlugen: „Ich musste pausenlos gegen Klischees und Vereinfachungen anreden. Eines Tages hatte ich dann das Bedürfnis, die letzten zwanzig Jahre, die Iran so gänzlich umgekrempelt haben, festzuhalten.“

Dieses Vorhaben ist ihr in der Tat eindrucksvoll gelungen. So schildert der erste Band mit dem Titel „Persepolis. Eine Kindheit im Iran“ in beinahe erdrückend schlichten Worten und Bildern die Ereignisse im Iran der frühen 1980er Jahre aus der Sicht der Zehn- bis Vierzehnjährigen Marjane. Als einziges Kind linksintellektueller Eltern aus dem gebildeten Mittelstand erlebt die zuweilen recht altkluge Marjane den Sturz des letzten Schahs, die islamische Revolution und den Krieg gegen den Irak mit. An die Hand genommen durch die Perspektive des wissbegierigen Kindes und aufbegehrenden Teenagers Marjane wird der Leser an eine schillernde iranische Gesellschaft herangeführt, die sich auch im scheinbar permanenten Ausnahmezustand, zwischen religiöser Repression, Krieg, materieller Not, politischer Unterdrückung, Indoktrination und Propaganda immer wieder Rückzugsnischen schafft und so eine gewisse Normalität zu bewahren versucht.

Eine schnörkellose Bildersprache

Wort- und Bildsprache Satrapis, die in Frankreich lange Zeit als Kinderbuchillustratorin arbeitete, sind schnörkellos, klar und einfach, ohne jemals vereinfachend zu sein, zutiefst berührend, ohne einseitig anklagend zu werden, von entwaffnendem Humor, wo man das Lachen erstorben glaubt. Wo die Künstlerin an die Grenzen ihrer Vermittlungsfähigkeit stößt, lässt sie bewusst Leerstellen: Bilder bleiben unkommentiert, jegliche abschließende Bildrahmung fehlt. Der Tod einer gleichaltrigen Spielkameradin wird in Wort und Bild nur als Möglichkeit angedeutet, dabei bildet eine vollständig schwarz ausgemalte Bildfläche mit der Unterschrift „Kein Schrei auf der Welt hätte mein Leid und meine Wut auszudrücken vermocht“ den einzigen (möglichen) Kommentar.

Nach den vielbeachteten MAUS-Comics des Künstlers Art Spiegelman hat Marjane Satrapi mit dem ersten Band ihrer Autobiographie einmal mehr gezeigt, wie viel Potential das Medium Comic im zutiefst empfindlichen Bereich der „kleinen und großen“ Geschichtsaufarbeitung entfalten kann.

Fortsetzung der Lebensgeschichte

Nachdem die deutschsprachige Ausgabe von „Persepolis. Eine Kindheit im Iran“ auf der Frankfurter Buchmesse 2004 als „Comic des Jahres“ ausgezeichnet wurde, liegt seit Anfang des Jahres mit „Persepolis. Jugendjahre“ (französisch 2002/03) endlich der zweite Band ihrer bewegenden Autobiographie vor. Zwischen Wien und Teheran, Kommune und Kopftuch, der offiziellen iranischen Selbstdarstellung und dem „wirklichen Leben der Menschen, das hinter den Mauern stattfand“ lässt Satrapi den Leser erneut in gekonnter Zurücknahme der Ausdrucksmittel an den Höhen und Tiefen ihres Lebens und Heranwachsens teilhaben. Obwohl auch der zweite Teil der Comic-Autobiographie eine übersichtliche Kapiteleinteilung aufweist, ist es schlichtweg unmöglich, Satrapis Lebensgeschichte in Etappen zu lesen. Die kleine große Erzählung Persepolis zieht den Leser schnell in ihren Bann und lässt ihn nur langsam wieder los. Es bleibt zu hoffen, dass Satrapi uns auch weiterhin an ihrem Leben und Fühlen teilhaben lässt und ihr Vorhaben Beifall, Nachahmung und Weiterentwicklung erfährt. In jedem Fall werden wir all denen, die in dieser Zeit tatsächlich etwas zu erzählen haben, Herz und Ohr weit öffnen.

Hinweise

Tomlinson, John/ Schooneveldt, Simon/ Harrington, Penny: Australian Workers and Unions Should Support Basic Income, 18.11.05

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The journey to a full universal Basic Income is essentially the search for the answer to just one question: „How do we best meet the income support needs of all who find they are without the capacity to provide for themselves?“ This paper will try to answer that question.

Introduction

 

Australia has a federal system where the Commonwealth Government has responsibility for social security. Nationally social security started with age and disability pension legis­lation in 1908. Since then, with the exception of blind pensions and child endowment, social security payments have been means – or asset – (sometimes both) tested. Thus the system is categorical and selective rather than universal. The categories reflect the positive light in which the needs of chosen beneficiaries are held by the powerful. For example, widows with children have been paid since the mid-1940s but most unwed mothers were not paid social security until 1973. Since 1977 the Government has assisted all lone parents who meet the specified requirements.

Australians have been subject to increasing inequalities in income and wealth distri­bution during the last two decades due in large part to a general acceptance of economic fundamentalist ideas and government enthusiasm for deregulation and globalism. Michael Costello[1], former Secretary of the Department of Industrial Relations, suc­cinctly summed up the changes occurring in Australia when he wrote: „If you were hard up, you used to get a hand-up from government. Now you get the back of its hand.“

Under the previous Labor Government, low paid workers were compensated for decli­ning real income from employment by increases in the social wage. The current conserva­tive Howard Liberal Coalition Government recently elected for a fourth term and now with ‚control‘ of both houses of the parliament has assaulted the social wage. The universality of Medicare (health insurance) has been weakened, the dental service for low-income earners abolished, and the social security safety-net has been under­mined. The 2005/6 Budget outlined the Government’s determination to get single parents back into the workforce once their youngest child is at school. Likewise, it has reinvigorated attempts to move people off disability pensions onto unemployment benefits with onerous ‚mutual obligation‘ activity requirements[2]. Since coming to office in 1996, this Government has undermined the dignity and rights of Indigenous Australians and asylum seekers.

Job insecurity has increased; the Government is determined to weaken the fair dis­missal legislation. The officially recognised unemployment level has dropped below 6% but if people who are underemployed, discouraged unemployed and disguised unemployed are taken into account the real level of unemployment is in the order of 12 to 18% of people of working age.  Unemployment and the weakening of the social secu­rity safety net are real issues for low-income wage earners because people in the bottom 30% of income distribution are the ones most likely to experience periodic unemploy­ment interspersed with short stints in casualised, part-time and precarious employment.

Captains of industry are gaining disproportionate rewards – the ratio between Chief Executive Officers‘ salaries and those of workers has risen from 3 times workers‘ salaries in the 1970s to 74 times workers‘ salaries[3]. Increasingly arduous work ‚flexi­bility‘ arrange­ments are being imposed. The industrial arbitration commission and the union movement are constantly challenged by Government attempts to impose a dra­conian industrial relations regime.

Australia over the last two decades has been converted from a reasonably caring, mixed economy with a frugal but comprehensive social security safety net into a country where private provision, „individualisation of risk“[4] and a „do it yourself wel­fare state“[5] is the order of the day. The Government has intensified the rhetoric about the evils of „welfare dependency“ as a way to decrease the legitimacy of claims for government assis­tance. In doing so it has foisted the obligation to support those in financial need back onto families.

This portrait of Australia may make it appear unlikely that a Basic Income paid to each permanent resident, as an individual, irrespective of their personal or social circumstances will be introduced in the near future: yet as will be seen there are grounds for optimism. A Basic Income system would be more just than the existing Australian system of income support. Low income-earners would be net beneficiaries of a Basic Income whereas rich Australians would not be economically advantaged by it because they would pay more in tax than they gain in benefits.

Income Support Schemes

Before we can examine Basic Income further, it is useful to outline other existing and proposed systems of income support.

Private superannuation and other privatised solutions

In Australia, private superannuation is the only form of superannuation available to non-government workers. The amount paid is proportional to contributions from workers‘ salaries (paid by workers and by their employers) or private investments made during the workers‘ employment. The inequalities experienced during working lives are extended into the post-working phase of people’s lives. All private superannuation funds are at some degree of risk. The Australian Government Superannuation watchdog recently warned that at least 10% of funds are insecure[6]. Some workers, particularly those who in recent years have been forced by their ‚employer‘ to become contractors, have private unemployment, sickness and accident insurance. It is not an affordable option for the majority of workers.

The Job Guarantee

A job guarantee can only exist when a government is prepared to commit itself to becoming an employer of last resort. In the last thirty years there have been two forms of limited job guarantee provided by Australian governments. The first in the 1970s, under the Whitlam Labor Government, was the Regional Employment Development Scheme, and the second was the job offer, after 18 months unemployment, under the Keating Labor’s Working Nation package in the mid 1990s. The Centre for Full Employment and Equity at the University of Newcastle is promoting the most detailed current Australian proposal for a job guarantee. Under a job guarantee, those who are available and capable of doing the work on offer will be assisted. But those who cannot find suitable child care, or have a disability will be unable to take up a job under the job guarantee unless child care is provided and the obstacles to obtaining and keeping employment are overcome for people with a disability.

Social Security

The greater the universality in any system of social security the nearer it comes to being an income guarantee. For instance, in Australia, all long-term residents who exceed specified age limits are entitled to apply for the age pension. The age limit for women is gradually being phased in to equal that of men. If their income and assets are below a specified amount they will receive payment. This is a Guaranteed Minimum Income for older Aus­tralian residents. Current age limits are 65 years for men and 62.5 years for women. Yet it needs to be remembered that the average age of death for Indigenous Australians is 56 years for men and 62 years for women. This compares with rates in the non-Indigenous population of 76 years men and 83 years for women. In Queensland, South Australia, Wes­tern Australia and the Northern Territory three-quarters of Indigenous male deaths and two-thirds of Indigenous female deaths occurred before the age of 65 years compared with one-quarter of male and one-sixth of female total deaths in Australia (ABS/AIHW (2003), p. 183.).

Social security benefits are targeted to those whom the government has decided should be paid. Complexity, stigma, system failure and recipients‘ lack of sophisticated knowledge about bureaucracies results in many eligible people not receiving their proper entitlements. The Brotherhood of St Laurence and St Vincent de Paul 2003 report entitled „Much Obliged“asserts that people who become long term unemployed have so much of their time taken up just meeting the obligations imposed on them by the Government that they don’t have time to find work: the report concludes the mutual obligation regime „is failing the most disadvantaged job seekers. Overall the system operates (…) not as ‚welfare to work‘ but ‚welfare as work'“[7].

Guaranteed Minimum Income, Negative Income Tax and Tax Credits

The first fully elaborated book length Basic Income proposal, in the English language, was written by Dennis Milner in 1920. A Guaranteed Minimum Income, if it is available to all permanent residents, is very much like a Basic Income except for the requirement to establish that an individual’s income and or assets are below the amount that is allowed. In 1943, Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams was the first English writer to provide a book length outline of the idea of a guaranteed minimum income. The purpose of such an income guarantee was in Rhys-Williams‘ words „to provide a ‚floor‘ below which he (or she) cannot fall, but ought not to have a ceiling beyond which he (or she) can rise“[8]. In 1970, Ian Braybrook wrote the first academic paper on negative income tax in Australia. The earliest Australian proposal to introduce a negative income tax was that of the Priorities Review Staff of the year 1975.

A Tax Credit is a form of negative income tax paid through the tax system. The aim of a guaranteed minimum income, negative income tax and tax credits is essentially to provide a minimum income guarantee to those whose incomes fall below a specified amount. All these generalised forms of income support differ, in theory, from categorical payments in at least one important regard. They make no presumption about social eligibility. Yet when income guarantee policies are formulated residues from categorical social security policies are frequently present. When Professor Ronald Henderson, Head of the Poverty Inquiry, proposed his guaranteed minimum income[9] he wanted a two-tiered structure, using the family as the unit of income, which distinguished between those in receipt of benefits or pensions and those who did not then qualify. Other Australian guaranteed minimum in­come proposals have used the household as the unit for payment[10]. Such proposals ignored the inequities present in intra-family and intra-household transfers.

Participation Income

Participation Income ideas are widespread in the present Australian system of income sup­port. Participation income is a euphemism for the chance to impose an obligation on people who receive government or government-subsidised payments coupled with the paternalistic belief that this will assist the recipient to improve their life. Many resear­chers have described the philosophical underpinnings of Participation Income as unethical[11] because the only choice offered to welfare recipients is comply or starve. The practical outcomes for those who are breached are socially disastrous[12]. Evidence is emerging from the United States which suggests that a reduction in or removal of social security payments leads to increased health difficulties for children.

There is little recognition that workfare jobs entrench low paid employment by displacing full-time, above poverty-line jobs[13].  „Work for the dole“ and Community Deve­lopment Employment Program (CDEP) jobs in Australia have a similar effect of entrenching poverty[14].  The CDEP is a „work for the dole“ program operating in Indige­nous communities since 1977. The bulk of Indigenous „jobs“ on Indigenous com­munities are CDEP „jobs“ – paid at about the rate of unemployment benefits and only the most misguided would claim that such „jobs“ have abolished poverty in Indigenous Australia.

Advocates of participation income seem oblivious to the life experiences of low paid workers‘ revealed in 2003 in the Australian Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union’s (LHMU) submission to the Senate Inquiry into Poverty. There is very little recog­nition of the demoralisation that follows in the wake of working full-time yet still being in poverty, or only being able to gain casualised, poorly renumerated, preca­rious employment.

The impact of enforcing obligations upon unemployed people, insufficiently employed people, lone parents and people with disabilities is the same whether it is expressed in the considered tones of Patrick McClure’s Report of 2000, or, one year before this, Minister Abbott’s suggestion that unemployed people are „job snobs“. The hysterical denunciation of „welfare dependency“ and particularly intergenerational „welfare dependency“ is based on a myth. There have been no intergenerational panel studies of long-term social security recipients in Australia. Recent overseas long-term panel studies refute such assertions[15]. Cook, Dodd and Mitchell[16] report that since 1975 in Australia there have been around eleven job seekers for each job vacancy.

Some researchers[17] have argued that if a Basic Income was put in place that workers would stay away from work in droves; whereas other researchers have argued the exact opposite[18]. The only study conducted in Australia into the impact on work willingness (where low-income families were provided with a guaranteed minimum income), showed these families experienced no decline in work willingness[19]. Van Parijs[20] claims that because a Basic Income is paid, irrespective of all other sources of income, it can be used by those who desire work as a wage subsidy; yet, because it provides sufficient income on which to live, it does not compel any potential worker to work under conditions which that worker finds unacceptable.

Effective Marginal Tax Rates

The rate of tax people pay is very confusing because of the progressive tax rates in the Australian income tax system, the presence of family allowances paid through the tax system and because the social security system and the tax systems intersect; as a result many families do not get much benefit from extra income they obtain by working.  Many low-income earners pay a greater proportion of their income in direct and indirect tax than do more affluent citizens. It is a long-acknowledged problem which governments over the years have failed to address adequately. The Government took a small step to reduce withdrawal rates from 70% to 60% in its 2005/6 Budget.

Tax

Australian taxpayers are, for most taxation purposes, assessed as individuals. But eligibility for most social security benefits is calculated in terms of total family income. A person applying for social security benefit can be refused payment if they have a partner who is earning more than a specified income. If an employed person is supporting a partner who is without income, that person cannot lower their tax by counting the income as spread between two people. A government, interested in assis­ting families to stay together, would not persevere with the existing social security arrangements which discriminate against people pooling their resources. With a Basic Income, unlike all the other forms of public assistance discussed, neither the employ­ment income nor the amount of Basic Income is directly affected by the other source of income. The withdrawal rate is the income tax rate on earned income. Importantly this removes poverty traps and work disincentives simultaneously.

In the current climate of individual work contracts and increasingly precarious employment, rather than relying upon individual employers to pay a wage sufficient to lift workers out of poverty, organised labour needs to consider whether there is not considerable merit in the collective provision of a Basic Income.

 

Why Australia needs a Universal Basic Income.

The income support issues with which Australia is grappling at the start of the 21st century are remarkably similar to those which many other countries are confronting. Anyone who reads the papers in the Basic Income Earth Network’s 2002 and 2004 Conference Proceedings, which detail the work of researchers from every continent, could not fail to be struck by the similarities in the debates. It needs to be remembered that in the decade prior to the 1980s there were many social welfare improvements and a great hope for even more. The Henderson Poverty Inquiry’s First Main Report of 1975 endorsed the idea of introducing a guaranteed minimum income and the Whitlam Labor Government seemed accepting of the idea.

 

Social protection

The prime reason for supporting a universal Basic Income is that it is the most socially just way of ensuring social protection[21]. In an ideal world everyone would have their needs fully met and all would contribute their utmost to ensure that everyone’s needs were met. This was essentially what the welfare state was meant to do in the post-Second World War period. The current Australian social welfare system, due largely to under-funding resulting from economic fundamentalists‘ constant attacks, is less capable of ensuring social pro­tection for the most vulnerable than the Australian welfare state of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Many of the family support structures which were the first port of call for help in earlier times have been eroded; full-time work above the poverty-line is harder to find.

Intergenerational distribution young / old

Whereas social insurance payments are largely paid for by the contributions of workers, social security in Australia is paid from general taxation. In the 1960s and early 1970s age pensioners were often confined to poverty level incomes. The Henderson Poverty Inquiry of 1975 exposed this sorry state of affairs and now the Australian social security system treats age pensioners far more generously than unemployed people and younger unem­ployed people in particular. In Europe similar age-delineated inequities have led to inter­generational envy. Older Australians need to realise that their taxes went to pay the pensions of their parents‘ generation. There is nothing left to pay theirs and if they don’t treat younger people better the young might refuse to contribute to older people’s support. A Basic Income, because it is paid equally to all, abolishes such inter­generational envy.

Affordability

In any social policy process the first and last question asked is „Is it affordable?“ No space has been devoted to this question so far and it must be addressed. The Henderson Poverty Inquiry of 1975 showed that its guaranteed minimum income scheme was affordable. Keith Rankin has written extensively on the economic affordability of Basic Income in New Zealand. George has specifically addressed this question in relation to the United States. The Irish Government has declared it is affordable there[22].

In Australia, Saunders[23] worried that a full universal Basic Income might require a 50% income tax rate which he considered politically unpalatable. This calculation was made prior to the GST which, now implemented, would lower the tax rate required to something more in line with what the Irish Government has recently declared would be necessary (that is 43 percent) to pay for an above-poverty-line Basic Income.  This would mean that the required tax rate to pay for a Basic Income would be at or slightly above the current tax rate imposed on incomes exceeding $63,000 (probably in the order of 45 percent).

Perhaps the last word on affordability should be left to José Iglesias Fernández[24] who proposed a full universal Basic Income scheme for Catalonia paid at 50% of the average European Union wage. Considering whether his proposal was affordable, Iglesias Fernández wrote that since the Basic Income was only half of the per capita income that therefore the money needed to pay for it already existed and that it was simply a matter of redistribution.

Efficiency

While Australia has 12 to 18 % of its working age labour force unemployed, underem­ployed, disguised unemployed or discouraged unemployed, it is clearly not making an efficient use of available labour in this country. The Commonwealth Government’s Committee on Employment Opportunities commented: „The loss of production through unemployment is the single greatest source of inefficiency in our economy. Unemployment is also the most important cause of inequality and alienation for individuals, families and communities“[25].

Governments in Australia are certainly capable of determining the cost of delivering specific categorical benefits to those who are paid. They can and do calculate how much they ’save‘ by cutting people off income support when they do not meet the eligibility requirements for any specific benefit. This is accounting or target efficiency. Govern­ments seem uninterested in what social costs are incurred in the wake of decisions to remove income support from such citizens. Target efficiency processes give no measure of how efficient the system of social security is as a whole.

Some of the system-wide questions, which would need to be answered if the efficiency of the system as a whole was being calculated, would be:

–      Are any of the people excluded from the social security system poor?

–      How many people who have an entitlement miss out?

–      How satisfied are the people who are confined to low levels of income support?

–      Does the social security system advance social justice for all permanent residents?

–      Are the human rights of all residents protected (or even enhanced)?

–    Does the system remove all obstacles to inclusion of people with a disability?

–      Are all genders, ages and ethnic groups treated equally or equitably?

–     Is there equitable treatment provided to people from the city and the country,

–     and does the system of income support provide sufficient security to recipients so as to allow them to contribute to society in ways with which they are comfortable?

Attempting to ascertain the degree of impairment experienced by an individual applicant and then paying those applicants who can establish they have met some predeter­mined ‚level of incapacity to work‘ is costly and an extraordinarily inefficient way of providing income support to those with a disability. People with equivalent levels of im­pairment often have widely different employment histories. It would be more efficient to provide a universal income guarantee if the desire is to encourage productivity/contri­bution/inclusion by those who have a disability. Australian govern­ments have recognised this in relation to Blind Pensioners[26] but continue to subject others who have severe dis­abilities to stigmatised, selective, targeted, categorical payments.

There are broader aspects of efficiency that can and should be mounted in support of an unconditional Basic Income:

–     A Basic Income requires the least interference in the lives of citizens.

–     It supplies all permanent residents with equal assistance.

–     It is the most inclusive form of income support payment and the most secure, thus enhancing citizenship.

–     It provides sufficient income to allow people to explore their creative capacity.

–     It removes many of the obstacles to a reinvigoration of industrial, technical and computing infrastructure.

–     It allows the State a fuller understanding of the impact of its other social wage policies.

Conclusion

A universal Basic Income is not a utopian idea. It is an efficient affordable way to ensure no Australian permanent resident remains in poverty. However, a Basic Income is just that – an unconditional universal income guarantee. It delivers an income floor without impeding productivity. It is a vast improvement on categorical selective social services. It is an advance on all social insurance and private provision schemes which invariably result in the „individualisation of risk“ and as a result create a „do it yourself welfare state“.

References

  • Abbott, T.: „Bridging the Incentive Gap“, Australia Unlimited Conference, 4th May 1999, see: http://www.tonyabbott.com.au/speech/Incentive%20Gap.
  • ABS/AIHW: The Health and Welfare of Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. ABS Cat.4704.0, 2003.
  • Basic Income Earth Network, see: http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/Index.html.
  • Braybrook, I.: „Negative income tax in Australia“, in: Australian Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1970, pp. 120-130.
  • Briggs, C./Buchanan, J.: „Australian Labour Market Deregulation: A Critical Assessment“, Research Paper 21 (1999-2000), Parliamentary Library of Australia, Canberra 2000.
  • Committee on Employment Opportunities: Restoring Full Employment. Common­wealth of Australia, Canberra 1993.
  • Cook, B./Dodds, C./Mitchell, B.: „The false premises of Social Entrepreneurship“, Paper presented on 21st November, Workshop: „Social Entrepreneurship: whose responsibility is it anyway?“, CofFEE, University of Newcastle 2001.
  • Costello, M.: „Poor live in the shadows“, in: The Australian, 25th July 2003, p. 11.
  • Edwards, M.: The Income Unit in the Australian Tax and Social Security System. Institute of Family Studies, Melbourne 1984.
  • Galvin, R.: „Can Welfare reform make Disability Disappear“, in: Australian Journal of Social Issues, Vol.39, No. 3, August 2004, pp. 343-355.
  • George, R.: Socioeconomic Democracy. Westport: Praeger 2002.
  • Goodin, R.: „False Principles of Welfare Reform“, in: Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 36, No. 3, August 2001, pp. 189-206.
  • Goodin, R./Headey, B./Muffels, R./Dirven, H.: The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 1999.
  • Hayes, J.: „Big super funds could fail: APRA“, in: Courier Mail, 30th August 2002, p. 1.
  • Healy, S./Reynolds, B.: „From poverty relief to Universal Entitlement“, presented at BIEN’s 9th International Conference, Geneva, 12th-14th September 2002.
  • Henderson, R.: Poverty in Australia. Vol. I and II, Australian Government, Canberra 1975.
  • Iglesias Fernández, J.: „Strong Models versus weak Models of Basic Income in Catalonia“, presented at BIEN’s 9th International Conference, Geneva, 12th-14th September 2002.
  • Jordan, A.: Permanent Incapacity: Invalid Pension in Australia. Department of Social Security, Canberra 1984.
  • Kinnear, P.: „Mutual Obligation: Ethical and social implications“, Discussion Paper, no. 32, The Australia Institute, August 2000.
  • Lerner, S./Clark, C./Needham: Basic Income: Economic Security for All Canadians. Toronto: Between the Lines 1999.
  • Liffman, M.: Power for the Poor. Sydney: George, Allen & Unwin 1978.
  • LHMU: „Confronting the Low Pay Crisis: A New Commitment to Fair Wagesand Decent Work“, Senate Poverty Inquiry Submission, 2003.
  • McClure, P.: „Participation Support for a More Equitable Society“, Reportof the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra 2000.
  • Milner, D.: Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity. London: George Allen & Unwin 1920.
  • Page, R.: „The Prospects for British Social Welfare“ in: British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century(ed. by Page, R. and Silburn, R.), Basingstoke: Macmillian 1998.
  • Priorities Review Staff: Possibilities for Social Welfare in Australia. Australian Government, Canberra 1975.
  • Rankin, K.: „A New Fiscal Contract? Constructing a Universal Basic Income and a Social Wage“, in: Social Policy Journal of New Zealand. Vol. 9, November 1997.
  • Rhys-Williams, J.: Something to Look Forward to. London: Macdonald 1943.
  • Rhys-Williams, J.: A New Look at Britain’s Economic Policy. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1965.
  • Saunders, P.: „Conditionally and Transition as Issues in the Basic Income Debate“, in: Income Support in an Open Economy: Basic Income Revisited. VCOSS, Melbourne 1995.
  • Schooneveldt, S.: „Do Mutual Obligation breach penalties coerce compliance with government expectations?“, in: Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 39, no. 2, 2004, pp. 155-167.
  • Shields, J./O’Donnell, M./O’Brien, J.: „The Bucks Stop Here: Private Sector Remuneration in Australia“, Labour Council of New South Wales, Sydney 2003, see: http://council.labor.net.au/community//public//files/The%20Buck%20Stops%20Here.pdf
  • Standing, G.: Beyond the New Paternalism: Basic Security as Equality. London: Verso 2002.
  • Tomlinson, J.: Income Insecurity: The Basic Income Alternative. 2003, see: http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/interest/e-books.jsp.
  • Van Parijs: Real Freedom for All – What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997.
  • Van Parijs, P.: „The Second Marriage of Justice and Efficiency“, in: Arguing For Basic Income (ed. by Philippe Van Parijs), London: Verso 1992.
  • Widerquist, K.: „A Failure to Communicate“, in: Promoting Income security as a Right(ed. by Standing, G.), London: Anthem 2004.
  • Whiteford, P.: „Work Incentive Experiments in the United States and Canada“, Research Paper, no.12, Research and Statistics Branch, Development Division, Depart­ment of Social Security, Canberra 1981.
  • Ziguras, S./Dufty, G./Considine, M.: Much Obliged: Disadvantaged job seekers‘ experiences of the mutual obligation regime. Brotherhood of St Laurence and St. Vincent de Paul, 2003, see: http://bsl.org.au/pdfs/MOreportV2.pdf
Endnoten    (↵ returns to text)

  1. Costello (2003).↵
  2. Galvin (2004) and Ziguras/Dufty/Considine (2003).↵
  3. Shields/O’Donnell/O’Brien (2003).↵
  4. Lerner/Clark/Needham (1999), p. 11.↵
  5. Klein/Millar, cited according to Page (1998), p. 307.↵
  6. Hayes (2002), p. 1.↵
  7. Ziguras/Dufty/Considine (2003), p. 43.↵
  8. Rhys-Williams (1965), p. 163.↵
  9. Henderson (1975).↵
  10. Edwards (1984).↵
  11. Kinnear (2000), Goodin (2001).↵
  12. Schooneveldt (2004), Ziguras/Dufty/Considine (2003).↵
  13. Briggs/Buchanan (2000).↵
  14. Tomlinson (2003), Ch. 4 and 6.↵
  15. Goodin/Headey/Muffels/Dirven (1999), pp. 260-261.↵
  16. Cook/Dodd/Mitchell (2001), p. 24.↵
  17. Whiteford (1981).↵
  18. Widerquist (2004), Van Parijs (1997) and Tomlinson (2003).↵
  19. Liffman (1978).↵
  20. Van Parijs (1992), p. 229.↵
  21. Standing (2002), Van Parijs (1997) and (1992).↵
  22. Healy/Reynolds (2002).↵
  23. Saunders (1995).↵
  24. Fernández (2002).↵
  25. Commonwealth Government’s Committee on Employment Opportunities (1993), p. 1.↵
  26. Jordan (1984).↵

Nattrass, Nicoli: AIDS, Disability and the Case for a Basic Income Grant in South Africa, 18.11.05

Veröffentlicht am von

AIDS gehört zu den heimtückischsten bekannten Krankheiten. Besonders in afrikanischen Ländern prägt sie stark das Gesellschaftsbild. In Ländern wie Südafrika, die AIDS-Erkrankten finanzielle Unterstützung gewähren, ist immer wieder zu beobachten, dass besonders arme Menschen sich über eine AIDS-Erkrankung in der Familie freuen. AIDS wird dann zu einem Argument für die Einführung eines bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens, um bewusst herbei geführte Erkrankungen zu verhindern.
Nicoli Natrass untersuchte die Bedingungen für die Einführung eines bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens in Südafrika.

Introduction

AIDS is a very serious problem in South Africa. According to the demographic model of the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA2002) for the year 2004, 19% of the adults between the ages of 20 and 64 (and 11% of all South Africans) were HIV-positive. This situation amounts to the deep socio-economic crisis experienced nowadays in the country. The AIDS-emergency in South Africa weakens the economic safeguard of households by reducing the productivity of – and eventually killing – mainly prime-age adults while simul­taneously deflecting scarce domestic resources towards the health-care of AIDS-affected family members. Especially vulnerable to these shocks are in fact the poorest households in South Africa.

It is particularly appalling that the engrossment of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa coincides with the fact that over a third of the nation’s labour force remains unemployed and lacks thereby of social security[1]. South Africa’s welfare system beholds a full employ­ment programme: means-tested grants exist for over-aged (old age pension) and under-aged (child grant), as well as for disabled citizens (disability grant). Not the less, jobless labour forces do not dispose of such contributions. This ‚gap‘ amidst the social security network of the country may be a good reason for explaining the frequent correlation between unemployment and poverty[2].

In fact, only the disability grant is available for people of working age. This reality leads not only to social problems within the nation, but – as explained below – to complications with the recently begun Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART), South Africa’s ‚rollout‘ on HIV prevention[3].

Welfare, AIDS and Disability in South Africa

Disability grants are accessible for all those ‚physically and mentally severely disabled‘, whose ages lie between 18 and 65. The whole system works according to a ‚medical model‘. The latter instructs medical officers recommending patients for disability grants to judge the patient’s capacity to labour independently of whether work is available or not[4]. People who have fallen into the fourth stage of AIDS, i.e. AIDS-sick, as long as they have passed a fairly generous means-test, become eligible for the disability grant. Yet these grants are to be renewed by officers periodically – every six months or up to every five years depending on the kind of contribution the patient is receiving. A dramatic consequence of this is that a patient on antiretroviral treatment who, during the treatment, turns up well enough to work should expect to lose his or her disability grant[5].

Disability grants (which pay up to R740 [approx. US$115] per month) seem to be an important source of income for AIDS-affected households in South Africa[6]. Survey evi­dence from Khayelitsha, Cape Town, reveals that for households receiving the disability grant, the contribution comprises between 41 and 49% of the total household income[7]. The profit obtained from the disability grants can be illustrated by the answer of a woman queried in another study, where she said: „I love this HIV“, a statement she explained as follows:

„Yes, I like this HIV/AIDS because we have grants to support us… Before I was living with my mother, my father and my sister; they didn’t work. Maybe I was passing three to four days without eating. People discriminated me and no one came in the house. The only thing helping was my grandmother’s pension. We survived through that money.  But after the illness, our lives have changed completely.“[8]

The notion of someone loving HIV seems at first shocking. But it is understandable – albeit in a terrible way – when considering the desperate circumstances to which households can be driven to when they lack of an income-earner. The advent of a disability grant, as was clearly the case for the respondent quoted above, can ensure a longer life-line for an entire family. Thus, the threat of its elimination, resulting of antiretroviral treatment, is utterly serious. If the data from Khayelitsha does constitute a reliable source, it may then suggest that average household income could fall by a third if a disability grant is lost through restored health.

This is evidently bad news for the prospects of the HAART-rollout. Firstly, there will be a great number of HAART-patients to which the access to certain food-products will be bounded once their disability grants are cancelled. People undergoing the treatment need to eat regular, nutritious meals in order to enjoy optimal health benefits. The loss of the disability grant could consequently threat a patient’s health status – thereby shortening his or her life – and could additionally increase viral loads in the patient, increasing by this means his or her infectiousness. Such consequences could undermine the benefits of the HAART-rollout both in terms of preventing from new HIV infections and of extending the lifetime of those infected[9]. Furthermore, a small, but significant percentage of the AIDS-affected may opt for discontinuing HAART so as to become AIDS-sick again and thus once more qualify to the disability grant; once it is reinstated, the patients take up again the treatment. In cases where the disability grant is cancelled as a result of restored health, some patients go for repeating the cycle. Besides the negative impact on the indivi­dual’s health, such behaviour can dramatically increase the development of drug resistant strains of the HIV virus, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the entire HAART-rollout. These reasons reinforce the necessity of carrying out a strong case in favour of the introduction of a basic income grant in South Africa’s social security system.

Towards a Basic Income Grant

One way out of the potential trade-off between disability grants and the antiretroviral treatment may consist in removing the grant altogether for HIV-positive people. Such measure would at least facilitate the disappearance of appalling incidents as described above. The result of this, however, could be socially distorting, since its discriminative core is liable of being censured: people disabled by AIDS can’t be categorically disentitled from government support. Moreover, the elimination of the disability grant for all citizens who are HIV-positive would certainly cut down an essential source of income in poor AIDS-affected households. Likewise, the resolution may have unfavourable effects on the nutritional state of people using antiretrovirals. By this means the efficacy of the treatment rollout would be reduced, allowing the following two conclusions: firstly, that in South Africa the decline of a private household income can in fact lead directly to lower food-expenditure. And secondly – taken the fact that AIDS is most common within poor social spheres -: that the ensuing growth of poverty could exacerbate the development of the AIDS epidemic.

An alternative response is to allow HIV-positive people to maintain their disability grants even after their health has been restored. There are, however, two problems with this strategy. The first is that perverse incentives, as described above, can’t be eliminated in this way. Allowing access to the disability grant for patients whose health has been restored may result in some people desiring to become HIV-positive. Although this may sound far-fetched, there is anecdotal evidence from the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal indicating that various persons become annoyed when having negative re­sults on their tests – arguing that they were hoping consequently to get the grant. In the Eastern Cape there is the saying that someone has ‚won the lotto‘ if the HIV-test draws positive. Such news is actually seen as a ticket to the disability grant. If antiretroviral treat­ment is regarded – indeed incorrectly – as a ‚cure‘ for HIV, then it is possible that some people may desire to become HIV-positive under the mistaken notion that they will be able to get access to the disability grant, and then be healed through antiretroviral treatment.

The second problem with allowing HIV-positive people to keep their disability grants, even when their health has been restored through antiretroviral treatment, is one of moral character. Why should HIV-positive individuals be privileged over others possibly equally needy, but HIV-negative? Put in this way, the question after the introduction of a Basic Income Grant (BIG) for all disabled nationals immediately arises. Nonetheless the esta­blishment of a BIG would need to be effected at a much lower level (probably in the range of R100 to R200 instead of the current maximum grant of R750). Households having lost the disability grant as a consequence of antiretroviral treatment would obtain in some degree a financial cushioning resultant of the fact that they, and each household member, would have received a BIG. This measure could help prevent people on anti­retroviral treatment from the temptation of quitting their obligations to the treatment’s regimens in order to restore a disability grant.

Suppose that a BIG is introduced for all people, say at R100 per month: what would then be the appropriate level of payment for the disability grant? If the payment to disabled people is to remain at its current level, then a disability grant on the top of the BIG could fall by R100 to R650. This means, for example, that if a person loses a disability grant for entering to antiretroviral treatment, his or her loss in income will consequently sum up R550 rather than R740 – and yet the patient will have a BIG aiding his or her subsistence needs. It is however possible that for some very poor individuals on antiretroviral treat­ment the gap between the disability grant and the BIG may still be large enough to encourage them to stop taking antiretroviral treatment in order to restore the grant. If so, then there is actually a case for reducing the value of the disability grant and/or raising the value of the BIG.

There is a range of arguments, both moral and economic, in favour of a generalized BIG[10], particularly in the case of South Africa[11]. This is not the place to review these arguments, nor the arguments against the introduction of a BIG. The point at present is simply to show that given the factual circumstances of the widespread of AIDS in South Africa and, as mentioned above, the perverse incentives associated with the removal of the disability grant, arguments have amounted in favour of the introduction of a BIG.

Previous research and financial simulations have shown that even a modest BIG of R100 per month for all South Africans could indeed contribute to reduce poverty and in­equality in South Africa[12]. This is the reason why the latest report of the Taylor Committee on „a comprehensive welfare policy reform“ argued in favour of a BIG[13]. According to Le Roux[14], financial means for a BIG could be gained through a 7.3% point increase in value-added tax (VAT) and a 50% boost on excise and fuel taxes. This scheme is broad-based and redistributive: those who spend more than R1,000 a month would end up paying more in consumption taxes than they benefit from the R100 BIG.

In earlier work, I estimated that the implementation of a full-scale AIDS prevention and of a treatment intervention that could provide HAART to all those in the need of it (i.e. with a rapid rollout and no share in antiretroviral treatment), would require an increase in resources equivalent to raising VAT by between 3 and 7% points according to the level of care provided to those suffering from any AIDS-related illness[15]. Given the subsequent, remarkable decrease in the price of antiretrovirals (between November 2003 and June 2004 the first line triple therapy treatment regimen dropped by 72%) the revenue expected to be raised would now probably require only an increase of between 1.9 and 5.7% points on VAT. If we take the mid-point estimate and sum it to Le Roux’s valuation of a necessary tax increase, then it seems that South Africa would have to raise tax revenues by an equi­valent of a 12% point increase in VAT so as to finance a BIG and implement a national AIDS prevention and treatment intervention for all who need it.

This, of course, implies a significant increase in taxation. The viability of this can’t be exactly estimated, as different societies tolerate different levels of taxation, and at different times. Welfare expenditure as a proportion of GDP has risen economic development, and in times of crisis, such as war, citizens have accepted large increases in taxation as legitimate[16]. The notion of what is and is not ‚affordable‘ thus varies according to social and economic circumstances. Given the high degree of unemployment and the progress of the AIDS epidemic, it is possible that a part of South Africa’s population does agree with an increase in taxation, and may be able to deal with it. Whether one appeals to Rawlsian logic to protect the lives and livelihoods of the poor, or to more radical left libertarian ideas of providing each citizen with a social dividend as a basic right, the issue in the end boils down to whether people can tolerate living in a society that forces AIDS-affected individuals to choose between income and health.

Finally, it is important to note that even if a BIG and a suitable AIDS prevention and treatment intervention were to be introduced, there is yet much more to be done regarding the problem of unemployment and poverty in South Africa. A BIG of R100 a month is ac­tually very small: it amounts only to one tenth of the average African per capita income, and to one twentieth of the average per capita income in South Africa. Addressing poverty through other means – most notably by encouraging labour-intensive growth – must therefore have an essential role in any future solution.

References

  • Bhorat, H.: „A universal income grant scheme for South Africa: An empirical assessment“, Paper presented at the 9th International Congress of the Basic Income European Network, Geneva 2002.
  • Coetzee, C./N. Nattrass: „Living on AIDS Treatment: A Socio-Economic Profile of Africans Receiving Antiretroviral Treatment in Khayelitsha“, Centre for Social Science Research, Working Paper No. 71. Cape Town 2004. Available on www.cssr.uct.ac.za.
  • Leibbrandt, M./Woolard, I./Bhorat, H.: „Understanding Contemporary Household Inequality in South Africa“, in: Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol. 24, no.3: 31-51. 2000.
  • Le Roux, P.:  „Financing a Universal Income Grant in South Africa“, in: Social Dynamics, vol.28, no.2: 98-121. 2003.
  • Nattrass, N.: „Unemployment and AIDS: The Social-Democratic Challenge for South Africa“, in: Development Southern Africa, vol.21, no.1, March: 87-108. 2004a.
  • Nattrass, N.:  The Moral Economy of AIDS in South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004b.
  • Seekings, J.: „Visions of Society: Peasants, Workers and the Unemployed in a Changing South Africa“, in: Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol.24, no.3. 2000.
  • Seekings, J.: „Providing for the Poor:  Welfare and Redistribution in South Africa“, Inaugural Lecture, University of Cape Town, 23 April. 2003.
  • Seekings, J./Nattrass, N. From Race to Class: The Changing Nature of Inequality in South Africa. Yale University Press, New Haven (forthcoming).
  • Simchowitz, B.: „Social Security and HIV/AIDS: Assessing ‚Disability‘ in the Context of ARV Treatment“, Draft paper presented at the Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town, July 29, 2004.
  • Standing, G./Samson, M. (eds): The Basic Income Grant in South Africa. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press 2003.
  • Taylor Committee: „Transforming the Present:  Protecting the Future“, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, RP/53/2002, Pretoria, Government Printer. 2002.
  • Van der Berg, S./ Bredenkamp, C.: „Devising Social Security Interventions for Maximum Poverty Impact“, in: Social Dynamics, vol.28, no.2: 39-68. 2003.
  • Van Parijs, P.: What is Wrong with a Free Lunch? Boston: Beacon Press 2001.
Endnoten    (↵ returns to text)

  1. Nattrass (2004a).↵
  2. Leibbrandt et al (2000); Seekings (2000); Seekings and Nattrass (forthcoming).↵
  3. Nattrass (2004c).↵
  4. Simchowitz (2004).↵
  5. Nattrass (2004c).↵
  6. Coetzee and Nattrass (2004).↵
  7. Ibid.↵
  8. Nattrass (2004b), p. 95.↵
  9. Nattrass (2004c).↵
  10. Cf., e.g. Van Parijs (2001).↵
  11. Cf., e.g. Standing and Samson (2003).↵
  12. Bhorat (2002).↵
  13. Taylor Committee (2002).↵
  14. Le Roux (2002).↵
  15. Nattrass (2004b).↵
  16. Seekings (2003).↵

Howard, Michael W.: Is a Generous Basic Income Compatible with Open Borders?, 18.11.05

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Die Forderung nach der Einfuhrung eines bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens wurde besonders in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten kontrovers diskutiert. Dass es sich dabei nicht nur um ein Problem der Finanzierung handelt, sondern auch Entwicklungen deutlich größeren Ausmaßes losgetreten werden können, macht Michael W. Howard deutlich.

For the purposes of this paper, I will take for granted that a strong moral case can be made within the framework of a liberal theory of justice for a basic income for all, if not globally, then at least within liberal societies. I am also going to assume that for some years into the future basic income advocates will need to focus on national basic income (NBI) policies, because neither a global basic income (GBI) nor a regional basic income (RBI) is feasible, and they may also be vulnerable to moral objections. I am not com­pletely convinced of this assumption, but I believe it is at least plausible, even if one is inclined, as I am, to favor GBI in principle. I will return briefly to this topic at the end of the paper.

Assuming then that NBI is the highest level on which BI can be practically considered, the problem I am addressing is a possible dilemma between generous egalitarian welfare policy, epitomized by NBI, and egalitarian immigration policy, epitomized by relatively open borders. If a generous NBI would trigger welfare mi­gration, and this in turn would undermine the economic or political feasibility of NBI, then egalitarians would have to choose between a generous BI and restrictive immigra­tion policies on the one hand, and on the other hand more open immigration policies but a less generous or more qualified welfare policy (BI for citizens only, or the benefits subject to familiar sorts of means tests and willingness-to-work requirements, or even further erosion of a commitment to a welfare state). If indeed this is a dilemma, then it is not enough to say, as some BI defenders do, that BI cannot solve all problems. In this case, BI would itself trigger a pro­blem in immigration that in turn would require either retreating from BI, or possibly making undesirable changes in immigration policy. Can we defend BI in light of possible welfare migration effects, and what kind of defensible immigration policy is compatible with NBI?

Three Migration Problems

There are in fact three distinct sorts of problems that BI advocates need to consider, cor­responding to three different sorts of migration. The first is „North-South“ or „vertical“ migration from relatively poor to relatively affluent countries. The second is „horizontal“ migration between countries that are on roughly the same level of develop­ment, but may differ in the level and structure of social benefits. The third problem, a spin-off of the first, concerns the ghettoization of immigrant groups. Although I will be concerned in this paper with the first of these, the other two may pose greater challenges to basic income per se, whereas the problems raised by the first may be common to all generous welfare policies and are not peculiar to basic income.

Horizontal migration may involve some welfare magnet dimension, but the more se­rious problem may well be the emigration of the highly skilled. Social benefits can be gene­rous with respect to level or with respect to conditionality. Basic income can be generous in the first sense (along with any other welfare benefit) and is inherently more generous in the second sense, insofar as it, being unconditional, is extended to more people. To the extent that it involves a shift in the real tax burden from lower to upper ranks of income earners (a success with respect to distributive justice), this may provoke an exodus of the highly skilled, thus eroding productivity and threatening the economic viability of the basic income itself. If immigration is difficult to control, emigration is even harder, particularly for this class of migrant sought by other coun­tries. Emigration might also be complemen­ted by immigration (horizontal or vertical) of low-skilled workers, seeking not so much the unconditional benefit per se, but the plentiful low-skill jobs made feasible by the basic income.

The ghettoization problem concerns those, often members of immigrant groups, but also subgroups among citizens, who are trapped in cycles of poverty and exclusion, because a) they have inadequate education, linguistic skills, and social networking, b) they fail to find regular well paid employment, and c) they consequently fail to integrate with others outside their subculture with whom they could form networks, acquire language skills, find work, and gain access to better neighbourhood schools. Migration networks can contribute to the growth of this part of the population. Basic income, by dropping a work require­ment, one might argue, enables such people to remain stuck in patterns of exclusion. This does not strike me as an insuperable problem (and may overstate the self-excluding dynamic and neglect discrimination as a factor), but it raises the question whether basic income, in combination with other programs, is a better solution to the problem of exclu­sion than a system of income support conditional on seeking paid work.

Is there a Migration Dilemma?

We should consider first the argument that there is a migration dilemma, at least politically, if not economically, for relatively generous welfare states with relatively open borders between member states. The answer may differ for different countries and regions. Roswitha Pioch, in a paper for the 2002 BIEN Congress, describes the substan­tial welfare gaps between wealthier and poorer EU countries, which is widening with the entry of state of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. She concludes that „these welfare gaps undermine the political viability of a basic income,“ because „countries that provide generous income support have become vulnerable to welfare migration under the EU’s freedom of mobility rules, which do not allow a country to discriminate against the nationals of another welfare state (…) if basic income is introduced in any one of the member states of the European Union, it must be offered to nationals of other EU member states as well“. It isn’t clear from her paper that welfare migration from a national basic income (NBI) would be economically unsustainable, but it may be politically unsus­tainable, she thinks, because „people would fear welfare migration (…).“ It should be possible to determine any welfare migration effect from unconditional income by com­paring European states with dif­ferent levels of child benefit. The child benefit amounts to a basic income for an age group. While the evidence would be inconclusive for the poten­tially more mobile single population, the presence or absence of any evidence of migration on account of child benefit should give us some indication of the relevance of benefit levels for migration decisions.

Turning to the U.S., the evidence on internal welfare migration among the native population is mixed. Some studies in the U.S. show no evidence of internal welfare migra­tion between states that have significant differences in the generosity of their benefits; others find evidence of „positive, but modest, effects of welfare benefit generosity on migration decisions“. However, the welfare gaps between states within the U.S. are rela­tively small compared to the differentials between some countries in the EU, or between the U.S. and Mexico. These larger gaps, and other differences between the native and immigrant populations would lead one to expect a more substantial „welfare magnet“ effect. This is the case even if most immigrants come in search of work and not state services. Although Borjas claims that „there is little evidence to suggest that inter­state dif­ferences in welfare benefits generate a magnetic effect in the native popu­lation“, he points out that the costs of interstate movement are lower for immigrants than for natives, and there is a clustering of immigrants in the more generous states. Furthermore, this clus­tering in California, one of the most generous states, is not due only to its proximity to Mexico and Asia (the latter the origin of many refugees), there is also clustering of non-Mexican and non-refugee immigrants. And while higher welfare benefits are generally not the reason for migration, they may discourage return to the country of origin if a person fails in the labor market. Higher welfare generosity, although not the magnet that draws, may be the magnet that holds.

Although there has been a trend toward greater use of welfare services by immigrants, still, at current benefit levels, it does not appear that most immigrants are migrating for the sake of benefits. Despite this, there has been significant backlash against immigrants, both at the national level and in California, where native house­holds pay an additional $1,200 per year in taxes to support social services for immigrants. Efforts have been made, sometimes successfully, to exclude undocumented immigrants from education and health care, and to deny pension and disability, food stamp and cash benefits to legal immigrants.

These mean-spirited policies have been accompanied by increased border patrol, resul­ting in „more than 2,640 border crossing-related deaths-10 times more lives than the Berlin Wall claimed during its 28-year existence-and a sharp increase in permanent settlement of unauthorized Mexicans in the United States“. Migrants have not been deter­red from entering the U.S.; they are only entering by more dangerous routes and incurring higher personal risks. On top of this we have the increased security after the 9/11 attacks. In this political climate, it is unlikely that any generous welfare policy could be introduced that promised to have even a modest welfare magnet effect.

However, I do not conclude from these observations that a NBI is politically unfeasible. Although NBI might face strong opposition grounded in irrational fears and prejudices, or even narrowly construed self-interest, it may still be politically feasible if it can be justified by appeal to a reasonable sense of justice. Perhaps the most important point to make is that the problems we are considering are just as likely to occur for conditional and means-tested benefits as for a basic income, so they do not constitute objections to BI as opposed to its alternatives. People migrate for work, not benefits, and if they would migrate for BI on account of their neediness, they would presumably also qualify and migrate for conditional benefits. If on the other hand they are working and contributing, then their productivity adds to the resources available for distribution, and their receiving a BI is not a net cost to the native community. Thus, in what follows, one could just as well speak of any generous welfare policy, as of NBI.

NBI for Citizens Only?

One solution to the welfare magnet problem would be to restrict NBI to citizens. This would partly just shift the problem, with applications for citizenship increasing dramati­cally, as the benefits of citizenship vis-à-vis residency increased. But more to the point, a citizens-only NBI is an unethical solution, and unworkable. Simply put, people who have been legally admitted, allowed to reside, to work, and who often are required to pay taxes, cannot be denied the benefits of full membership, even if they are not citizens. In the U.S., where, as I just indicated, an effort has been made to deny benefits to legal immigrants (benefits much less generous than NBI), it has proven difficult in practice to enforce in many respects. In the European context it is already not even a legal possibility at the current stage of integration. One also has to consider a labor market in which the wages of some would be supplemented by (and perhaps lowered because of) a BI, while others would have no supplement and reduced wages. How could such a two-tiered system be justified? Addressing the migration dilemma thus shifts to the border.

NBI and Tightening the Borders?

Philippe Van Parijs, who supports a GBI in principle, but NBI for residents as a second best, endorses some measure of border control against economic migrants. „In the mean­while, however, do not let people in too easily from poorer countries – because capital migration is a less painful process, because the least advantaged, being less mobile, are not likely to benefit, and above all because it would undermine any serious attempt to equalize, be it locally and partially, wealth and job assets.“

If this strategy were construed narrowly as stronger border enforcement, it would carry a heavy price indeed, in lives but also money, and might even be counterproductive with respect to the narrow aim of reducing the number of im­migrants, because of the disincentive to return home, as we have noted. Stronger worksite enforcement is likely to be ineffective, politically unpopular, and economically disruptive. President Bush’s pro­posed temporary worker program is likely to produce a parallel flow of undocumented workers, and „permanent settlement of ‚temporary‘ workers whose continued services are sought by employers.“ Cornelius concludes that „the most effective approach would be to get serious about creating alternatives to emigration in the key sending areas of Mexico and Central America… Any strategy of immigration control that addresses only the supply side is doomed to failure“.

A GBI or RBI could be part of a policy addressing the demand side. But our starting point was the premise that in the short term we are not able to do this successfully. Now we find that a precondition of NBI, controlling the supply side of immigration, may be unworkable. In this light, as I suggest at the end, a GBI or RBI may be less utopian than a NBI.

Hillel Steiner has argued that NBI is a form of „justice among thieves,“ by allowing each wealthy country to share among its own citizens more than their fair share of global wealth. Philippe Van Parijs offers two defenses of NBI against this charge, first that if we take into account human capital as well as resources, „solidaristic patriotism“ might well enable poorer countries to retain their own skilled workers. Second, what is important is not national wealth but basic income potential. Solidaristic patriotism, even if it reduces a (poorer) country’s wealth, may facilitate a higher basic income, because of the greater willingness of citizens to keep their assets in the country and be taxed. So some border restrictions may have egalitarian justification. But when do the border restrictions implied by solidaristic patriotism become unfair?

In a longer paper I explore a number of arguments for and against open borders that I cannot rehearse here. I will close only with the approach that I have, to date, found most compelling for addressing conflicts between duties to compatriots and duties to non-compatriots, duties to compatriots favoring restrictions on immigration, and duties to non-compatriots favoring open borders.

Darrel Moellendorf argues that all associations generate duties. Hence political association, in particular that of the state, generates specific duties among compatriots. But global associations also generate duties among non-compatriots, and because these involve the distribution of some of the same resources involved in duties among compatriots, there is potential conflict between these two classes of duties. Moellendorf does not think that there is in general a priority of one kind of duty over the other. However the distribution necessary for political equality – and we might add, solidaristic patriotism – may put justifiable limits on the distribution necessary for global equality of opportunity or a global difference principle. „If we have democratic duties to our compatriots, it is quite plausible that we have duties to limit inequalities so that they are consistent with healthy democratic politics. The idea is that sufficiently large socioeconomic inequalities give rise to inequalities in power that corrupt democratic processes, or may render the worst-off either unable to participate, or unwilling to participate, because of a justified loss of faith in the political process. These reasons are not sufficient, however, to justify the view that redistributive claims of compatriots necessarily trump those of non-compatriots“.

Although the claims of non-compatriots involve a greater need, duties toward com­patriots may be more realizable, „where extensive state institutions of redistribution exist and can be operated or built upon (…) [and thus duties of compatriots may trump those of non-compatriots] because what is important is achieving what justice demands“.

The claims of non-compatriots set a long term goal, and a duty to develop effective institutions for fulfilling that duty. The claims of compatriots require us not to move so rapidly toward global justice that we undermine the only effective redistributive institutions that currently exist, by undermining political equality, and by straining the commitment of citizens to a shared political community. A policy of not worsening the worst-off among compatriots, while attending in the long run to the worst-off generally, is a policy that acknowledges the claims of global justice, while respecting the special obligations among compatriots.

A sociological conjecture may reinforce this position. Individuals do not develop an ef­fective sense of justice-a sense of justice that overrides self-interest-merely by reflecting on the equal worth of all persons. They learn first to love and care about family and personal friends. Then they learn to widen the circle of concern to members of their local com­munity, and from there to larger political associations. Through personal friendships and experiences, education, and rational reflection, this circle can be widened further, to encompass global concerns. But if the social basis for a sense of justice is weakened, there is little chance that these wider sympathies will develop. This is not an argument for the superiority of duties to compatriots over duties to non-compatriots, but only a conjecture that solid institutions for fulfilling the former are preconditions for developing institutions that better address the latter. One bit of evidence in support of this conjecture is the per­centage of national income directed to foreign aid from affluent countries with well-developed welfare states versus the percentage from affluent countries with relatively weak welfare states – Norway versus the United States, for example.

In conclusion, NBI policy should be designed to address the implications of NBI for immigration. There is likely to be a tension between generous NBI and relatively open borders, and more open borders are to be expected from further economic integration. While the case for tightening borders is rather weak, and the effort to reduce immigration at the border can be counterproductive, some restriction can be justified as politically reasonable in order not to strain the commitment of citizens to egalitarian principles by making the poorest citizens significantly worse off. At the same time, the claims of global justice need to be acknowledged, and wealthier states put on a path toward egalitarian justice on a global scale. A first step would be serious exploration of a workable GBI, or, in the western hemisphere, a RBI similar to a proposed European BI.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper from participants at the 2004 BIEN Congress in Barcelona, Spain, and the Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics, Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, particularly Philippe Van Parijs, Yannick Vanderborght, Iwao Hirose, and Jan Erk.

References

 

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  • Borjas, George J.: Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999.
  • Cornelius, Wayne: „Evaluating Enhanced US-Border Enforcement“, in: Migration Infor­mation Source, 1st May 2004: http://www.migrationinformation.org.
  • Howard, Michael W.: Basic Income and Migration Policy: A Moral Dilemma? Online for the 10th BIEN Congress, Barcelona 2004: http://www.basicincome.org.
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  • Pioch, Roswitha: „Migration, Citizenship, and Welfare State Reform in Europe: Overcoming marginalization in segregated labour markets“, presented at the Ninth International BIEN Congress, Geneva 2002, see: http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/ Index.html.
  • Schmitter, Philippe/Bower, Michael: „A Modest Proposal for Expanding Social Citizenship in the European Union“, in: Journal of European Social Policy, no. 11:1, 2001, pp. 55-65.
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  • [aartikel]0271008881:left:wwwavinusmaga-21[/aartikel]Van Parijs, Philippe: „Commentary: Citizenship exploitation, unequal exchange and the breakdown of popular sovereignty“, in: Free Movement: Ethnical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money (ed. by Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin), New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992, pp. 155-165.
  • Van Parijs, Philippe: „Hybrid Justice, Patriotism and Democracy: a Selective Reply“, in: Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs (ed. by Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams), Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2003, pp. 201-16.
  • Van Parijs, Philippe/Vanderborght, Yannick: „From Euro-Stipendium to Euro-Dividend“, in: Journal of European Social Policy, no. 11:4, 2001, pp. 342-52.
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Van Parijs, Philippe: Does Basic Income Make Sense As a Worldwide Project?, 18.11.05

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Does basic income make sense as a worldwide project? To my own amazement, I have come to believe that it does, incomparably more than I did when we founded the Basic Income European Network in 1986.

To explain this, I first need to distinguish two senses in which one might think of turning basic income from a national, or at most a European, into a worldwide project. There is the swelling and there is the spreading.

Swelling the project?

Swelling the basic income project into a worldwide one consists in imagining that it can be organised in a truly universal way, administered and funded at a global level.

I have great respect for the moral commitment of those who have been mobilising around that idea, most forcefully perhaps the Dutch artist Pieter Kooistra and his Foundation “UNO basisinkomen voor alle mensen” (2). Yet, for our generations this is pure speculation. Not the less, pure speculation needs not be useless speculation. And in this case it is definitely not too early to start considering Basic Income seriously as a worldwide project. Indeed, as ever stronger worldwide interdependencies make progress in this direction, it’s become more feasible and more necessary.

Obviously, a crucial part of that speculation concerns the funding. Let me just state, without argument, a couple of negative and a couple of positive convictions. I do not believe in the viability of a worldwide personal income tax, since the exact definition of taxable income should, from my point of view, rather be left at a far more decentralised level. Nor do I believe in the relevance, for this purpose, of Tobin-type taxes on international transactions. They may be useful for keeping destabilising speculation in check or funding expanded supranational organisations in less precarious a way than is currently the case. But their equilibrium yield would fall far short of making a significant contribution to the funding of a worldwide basic income.

More worth exploring, in my opinion, is the idea of combining the shift to one single global currency, as advocated e.g. by Myron Frankman (3), and the use of the seignorage rights associated with this currency for funding a modest non-inflationary basic income at the level of the annual growth of the world GDP, along the lines developed by Joseph Huber (4).

Finally, and of least remote relevance, is the idea of a fair worldwide distribution of a sustainable volume of tradable pollution rights – as distinct from a distribution according to existing levels of pollution of the sort currently considered. To reflect Thomas Paine’s old notion of an equal repartition of the resources of the planet, this would come down to a uniform global tax on the volume of emissions whose revenues would be distributed according to population size.

Even in the long term, however, this swollen basic income will not come in substitution, but in support of a basic income funded at a far less global level. Moreover, it will come only if a large number of far more local schemes first prove that implementation difficulties can be overcome and that key objections can be refuted, however adverse a country’s circumstances may seem.

Spreading the project? The Congo

For the time being, therefore, by far the most important interpretation of the central question in this paper concerns the diffusion of Basic Income as a worldwide project. In other words: does it really make sense to think of spreading the project beyond those relatively affluent countries with fairly developed welfare states, in which Basic Income first took root? In recent years, two sets of contrasting impressions have strongly affected my thinking on this subject.

In the spring of 2001, I discovered the Congo in the course of what was one of the most mind-blowing academic trips of my life. Among the many aspects that struck me about the situation in the Congo, I’ll now mention three that are directly relevant to our matter.

When the Congo became independent from Belgium, both countries had about 10 million inhabitants, slightly more for the Congo, slightly less for Belgium. Four decades later, Belgium has laboriously reached 10.5 million, while the Congo approaches an 52 million. A walk through the sandy streets of Kinshasa gives always the impression of strolling through a kindergarten. Yet it cannot help feeding our concerns about how vigorous the demographic transition will need to be and how ill-advised has been any transfer scheme for slowing it down.

Another striking experience was talking with people at the very top of the Congo’s state apparatus. There, you realise that no one has (or at any rate had then) much of a clue as to how many people the government is employing, who these people are, how often and how much they are paid. Can you imagine, in this context, conveying an income in reliable fashion, not merely to some thousands of civil servants, but to several millions of citizens?

Last but not least, one has to consider the cultural barriers within the own country’s population. What political chances can there be for a serious and ambitious programme in favour of the poor in a country in which nearly all political, administrative and academic life operates in French, a language mastered by a small and shrinking minority of less than 10% of the population? How can the voices of those who would stand to benefit from such a programme be sufficiently heard, while looking forward to making significant, politically sustainable steps?

While flying back from the Congo, I sat thinking about these three sets of considerations – shortly after having to escape from a last attempt by some locals, at the airport in Kinshasa, to get a small first instalment of their prospective worldwide Basic Income. Had I been asked then whether Basic Income made sense as a worldwide project, I’m pretty sure I would have said no.

Spreading the project? South Africa

Yet, not long after I got back, I found out, bit by bit, both about what was already in place and what was being vocally demanded in a country, geographically as well as socio-economically, not quite distinct from the Congo: the Republic of South Africa.

What is in place? First and foremost, as regards our subject, a non-contributory, monthly pension of 600 Rand (or EUR 60), paid, at the time, to all women aged 60 or over, and to all men aged 65 or over. These must have been subject to a means test that practically amounts to excluding all households entitled to a pension from the formal sector, and only them. Developed during the final years of the apartheid regime, this scheme is far more redistributive than all other aspects of the South-African tax-and-transfer system taken all together. It is also without a doubt the largest redistributive transfer scheme in the whole of the African continent. About 80% of the age-qualified Black population of South Africa reports receipt of it, compared to about 10% of the age-qualified White population. In total, 75% of the recipients are women (5).

What is most remarkable about this scheme is that it works: that it has somehow managed to tackle the huge implementation problems involved in reaching nearly two million beneficiaries, many of them illiterate and living in remote rural areas. Remarkable too is that the redistribution effected through it reaches far beyond its immediate beneficiaries. The granny’s pension is the main source of formal income for a large number of extended households, with wide-ranging effects across generations, most strikingly on the granddaughters’ health (6). Moreover, making title-holders out of the elderly obviously has the advantage of handling the demographic problem far better than any other simple type of poverty alleviation scheme. And it avoids any direct work disincentive for the population of working age – which is not to say that it does not come without intrinsic defect, as expressed for example in the alleged tendency for the administrative existence of grannies to significantly outstrip their physiological life.

On the background of both the success and the limitation of this remarkable scheme, South Africa has recently witnessed the surprising development of a powerful movement calling without the slightest ambiguity for a fully unconditional universal basic income at a monthly rate of 100 Rand (about EUR 10). A basic income coalition has been formed around this demand, with the support of the Churches and, most strikingly, the Trade Union Confederation, COSATU.

One key question is of course: Will the administrative cost of delivering so widely such a small amount not end up swallowing an absurdly large share of the resources? Advocates are quick to respond that any serious means test would lend itself to far more waste and abuse. Another key question is who is going to pay. If it becomes clear that the bulk of the net funding will need to come out of the salaries of formal sector workers, how can one expect strong Trade Union support to persist? Will it help to point out that fewer remittances will need to be sent to the villages once all the workers’ relatives receive a basic income grant? Will it help to turn to indirect taxation, as forcefully advocated for example at this congress by Pieter Le Roux (7), on the ground that a VAT strategy would spread the tax net far more widely beyond the incomes of formal sector workers?

My own prediction is that this campaign will fail, in terms of its stated immediate objectives at any rate. But such a failure must not breed despondency. Qua advocates of basic income as a worldwide project, we must be cold-blooded enthusiasts, prepared to cope with countless disappointments and always ready to draw lessons for the next move.

Whatever the fate of South Africa’s deeply impressive and, in my opinion, totally unexpected basic income campaign, it is clear that in this domain, as well as in several others, this is a country whose development we must follow closely. Given their demographic situation, it is to South Africa rather than to Brazil, and in particular to its pension scheme, that African countries should first turn in order to draw lessons for what can and should be done.

Spreading the project? Santos

This certainly does not mean that nothing is to be learned from Latin America. Indeed, it is a Latin American contrast I want to use as a second way of putting into perspective the ambition of spreading the basic income project.

In the summer of 2002, I happened to be in the city of Santos, of Pelé fame, on the Brazilian coast, standing on a platform raised above a huge crowd next to front-running presidential candidate Lula and his party fellow and federal senator Eduardo Suplicy, his challenger for the presidential nomination a few months earlier. When it fell upon Lula to speak, at the frantic end of the joyful meeting, it turned out that the importance of work was one of the two themes he had chosen to address. “What we demand”, he explained, pouring with sweat, to a cheering crowd which hardly needed convincing, “is not alms but jobs, not a handout but work.” One of the greatest days in his life, Lula movingly told his supporters, was when he came home to his mother to hand over his first salary. When he subsequently lost his job, he smeared some grease on his overalls to make his mother believe he was still working. It is work, not income, that gives people the dignity, the respect they long for, Lula proclaimed. And the crowd loudly approved.

I too agree with him. In a very important sense, there is incomparably more dignity, more respect, to be gained from grease on one’s trousers than from a basic income in one’s pocket. Recognition, appreciation, esteem by those we care about, and by society as a whole, cannot and must not be given as a right to anyone. It can and must be earned through doing with some degree of effort and competence things that are of some use to others. And for most people, the regular performance of paid work is the most obvious and important means for this purpose. There is no need for basic income supporters to deny this. Indeed, it is a central part of their analysis that a basic income is a key precondition for giving everyone real access, in sustainable fashion, to both a decent standard of living and to the sort of activity that can provide the recognition a job is supposed to give.

Jobs for all and three meals a day for every Brazilian were the two central objectives emphasised in Lula’s presidential campaign. But to make them compatible, and sustainable, something like a basic income is needed. Owing to Eduardo Suplicy’s persuasive lobbying, the idea of a universal citizen’s income has been incorporated into Lula’s presidential programme by the party’s assembly, along the lines developed in the Senator’s recent book, Renda de Cidadania: A saida é pela porta (8). But listening to Lula on the Santos rostrum suggested that this was hardly more than lip service or a friendly concession to a long-time loyal supporter, that he had not made the link between what he really cared about and the basic income idea.

The following day, as I bid Eduardo farewell at the Sao Paulo airport, where he had kindly driven me through the morning fog, and then queued into the plane and sat down, the intense memories of that extraordinary evening and of the whole of my brief stop in Brazil overcrowded my mind. If a voice as articulate and eloquent, as convinced and convincing, as insistent and inexhaustible as this man’s does not do the trick, if he does not manage to persuade his life-long comrade who may soon be running one of the biggest countries in the world, if this unique chance is missed, then can anyone ever hope to overcome understandable resistance within a party calling itself the workers’ party and to move basic income to the political agenda of a less developed country? Had someone asked me, as the plane took off over the sleepy metropolis, whether Basic Income made sense as a worldwide project, I am not sure I would have said yes. I would have been wrong.

Spreading the project? Medellín

Three planes later, I landed in Medellín, Colombia. As part of the celebration of its 25th anniversary, the Escuela Nacional Sindical, a nation-wide training school for trade union officials and activists, had specifically invited me to give, next to more academic talks at the University of Antioquia, a public lecture on Basic Income. The event, I discovered, had been carefully prepared by a substantive dossier in the School’s magazine and was punctuated by the publication of a little book, collecting some of my works on global justice (9).

I was amazed, not least because the initiative came from Trade Union circles. But my hosts soon helped me understand better why such importance was given to the Basic Income project under conditions of civil war (a bomb exploded during a break, 200 m from where I was giving my talks) and breakdown of law and order (10), which would seem to impose quite different priorities.

Behind Colombia’s violence, and mixed with many other factors, hides the ideological clash between what often seem to be the only real, coherent options around: the neo-liberal credo, to which all people in power seem to be resigned, and the millenarian socialism to which the guerrilla claims allegiance. In this context, it is regarded as no mean feat to be able to offer a vision of the future, local and global, which can be vindicated systematically as a radically distinct approach on the high ground of ethics and political philosophy, while inspiring specific policies of far more modest scope which can both weather technical economic objections and promise to improve the situation of some of the weakest.

Significant steps towards a basic income may be further off the road in Colombia than in some other countries, because of the direct and indirect drain on resources caused by the civil war. But precisely because of this context the basic income project receives particular ideological importance as a meaningful alternative horizon, as a way of remaining loyal to the fundamental aims of the socialist tradition while making uninhibited but intelligent use of the market mechanism. In other contexts, the ideological need may be less pressing, but everywhere it gives the basic income project a potential role which goes far beyond the fixing of some shortcomings of conventional welfare states. In Santos or Sao Paulo no less than in Medellín or Cape Town, parties and organisations that conceive themselves as defending the interests of all workers can and will understand that such a project must be made part of the vision that gives their struggles a meaning.

Moving forward. Montevideo’s carriage

In a park that surrounds Montevideo’s Centenary Stadium, there is a huge bronze statue representing a carriage badly stuck in the mud. The carriage is pulled by four powerful oxen, it is followed by a fifth one, and a gaucho escorts it on his horse. Melt in bronze, you could not help think, there is no way these poor oxen will ever get the carriage unstuck. But real carriages are not confined to bronze. The gaucho may have to jump off his horse and dirty his trousers to get on moving. The ox behind may need to be harnessed, and nearby walkers may need to be given a job, those with a smart brain or with a big mouth, others with a great heart or with a big ego, those with the breath of marathon runners or with the patience of a Benedictine monk. Getting the carriage to move forward will require some to push and others to pull, some to pinch and shout and even sing, while others fiddle around the wheels or tighten some screws, or pull ropes attached to the carriage, or even explore alternative tracks a long way ahead to help keep clear of treacherous mud or prohibitive slopes.

So it is, in particular, with the carriage of Basic Income as a worldwide project. As a philosopher, I hold the (admittedly self-serving) conviction that this carriage is helped forward more than hampered by the sort of austere thinking incorporated in my Real Freedom for All (Oxford, 1995) and other like-minded writings, which attempt to build a rigorous ethical case for Basic Income, a sound intellectual foundation that cannot easily be dismissed by academics of any description and cannot easily be shaken even by the smartest of arguers.

But of course, forward movement is helped far more directly, powerfully and visibly in many other ways. It is helped, for example, by those who feed the public debate by putting together a bunch of thoughtful contributions on Basic Income, some more favourable, some more critical, as was done in recent years, for example, by Loek Groot and Robert J. van der Veen (11), by Angelika Krebs (12), Nina Kildal (13), Daniel Raventos (14), Josh Cohen and Joel Rogers (15), by Ruben Lo Vuolo (16), Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams(17), Keith Dowding, Jurgen De Wispelaere and Stuart White (18), by Erik O. Wright (19) or by Guy Standing (20). In the context of such bundles, and indeed also in the context of events such as the congresses of the Basic Income European Network (BIEN), it is of crucial importance to listen and keep listening to sympathetic and intelligent but unambiguously critical voices. For the Basic Income movement, there is no surer recipe for degeneration into an irrelevant utopian clique than shutting oneself off from intellectual challenges.

But to get the carriage of basic income to move, and to keep it moving, far more is needed than intellectual debate. It requires the tireless enthusiasm of campaigners, such as those who designed the lovely posters of South Africa’s Basic Income Grant campaign, who stuck them up, who organised human chains in the streets of Johannesburg, marched on public buildings and lobbied in hundreds of ways.

It is helped by the countless small pressures, meetings, proposals, decisions that have led, for example, nearly all 5,581 Brazilian municipalities to introduce some form of guaranteed minimum income for families, however limited in level and scope.

It is helped by bold statements by people who manage to fulfil important functions in a responsible way without losing either their vision or their guts. Thus, ILO Director, General Juan Somavia, concluded his welcome address at the opening session of BIEN’s Geneva Congress, on September 2002, by proclaiming: “And yes, the moment may be nearing when your ideas will become commonsense.”

Moving forward. Brasilia’s ceremony

More than by anything else, Basic Income as a worldwide project is helped by acts that go beyond sheer intentions. No doubt the most exhilarating and least expected moment I experienced as a Basic Income supporter was when less than two years after the Santos speech I was invited back to Brazil to take part, on the 8th January 2004, in a hardly credible ceremony. Overlooking the world-famous Praça dos Três Poderes designed by Oscar Niemeyer, the ceremonial room of the President’s Palácio do Planalto was gradually filling with journalists, photographers, TV crews, ministers and other political dignitaries. Facing the swelling audience stood four empty chairs. And behind them, a large wall covered by colourful smiling faces of people of all ages and races, alternating with an inscription in large letters: “RENDA BÁSICA – Cidadania para todos” (“Basic income. Citizenship for all”).

Then an off voice announced the arrival of the President, and the crowd went quiet, as Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his wife Marisa sat down. By their side were the Ministro da Casa Civil (Brazil’s de facto Prime Minister), José Dirceu, and Federal Senator Eduardo Matarazzo Suplicy, author of the law proposal which the President was there to sign.

Summoned by the off voice, I rose to the pulpit to indicate briefly what I saw as the world-wide significance of the event. Next was Senator Suplicy’s turn. Visibly moved, having retraced his long fight for the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income in Brazil, he eloquently recited a poem, restated the key advantages of a universal citizen’s income over means-tested schemes, thanked the various Workers‘ Party heavyweights who had helped the proposal through the critical stages, and ended, in a way that did not exactly go unnoticed in the Brazilian press, by warmly hugging the President. After the signing ceremony of the law, Lula paid homage to the determination of his old comrade, whom he described as the inexhaustible Don Quixote of minimum income, while warning that there was no magical solution to Brazil’s problems and that the new law would only be introduced gradually.

Notwithstanding this presidential caution, this was definitely a “day of glory” for the very popular 62-year old Sao Paulo Senator. A first culmination in his fight had been the unanimous adoption of his minimum income proposal of 1991 by the federal Senate, never endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies. His more ambitious citizen’s income proposal of 2001 was, on the contrary, only approved with some amendments by the Senate in December 2002 and by the relevant commissions of the Chamber of Deputies in September and November 2003. The President had until January 2004 to either veto or sanction it. He chose the latter.

Does this mean that the carriage has reached destination in a most significant part of the world? Not at all. As initially formulated, the 2001 Suplicy proposal stipulates that, subject to it being endorsed by a national referendum in 2004, “an unconditional basic income, or citizenship income” will be introduced in 2005 for every Brazilian citizen or foreign resident for five years or more, that it will be of equal value for all, payable in monthly amounts and sufficient to cover “minimal expenses in food, housing, education and health care”, “bearing in mind the country’s level of development and budgetary possibilities”. However, two main amendments were made before unanimous approval by the Senate: the idea of a referendum was dropped, on the ground that, anyway, everyone would be in favour, and a new article was added, stipulating that the basic citizenship income “will be realized in steps, at the discretion of the Executive, giving priority to the neediest layers of the population”. It is with these two amendments that Suplicy’s proposal was signed by Lula.

From the second amendment it follows, no doubt, that Brazil is bound to remain stuck for quite a while with a means-tested system. But this does not make the law meaningless. Firstly, the existence of the law eases progress towards a stronger integration of existing assistance schemes with one another, and towards a stronger integration of the social assistance system with both the social insurance system and the income tax system, as Brazil’s federal government is henceforth legally entitled to take any number of further steps, in a financially responsible way, towards a full universal basic income.

Secondly, the long-term perspective firmly asserted in the new law should help face the powerful objections that will no doubt arise soon, as the federally funded means-tested system keeps getting more comprehensive and less stingy, and as individual and collective beneficiaries strategically adjust to its getting established. When over 50% of the active population works entirely in the informal sector, the income test needs to rely essentially on declarations of income earned by the beneficiaries. As the officials in charge of the existing income-tested Bolsa Família system are well aware, there is no realistic way of seriously checking whether the declarations are correct. This generates a dilemma. Either one needs to be ready for major problems of arbitrariness in or resentment about local decisions of inclusion and exclusion, in particular of a clientelistic kind. Or one needs to devise more observable alternative proxies of income poverty, such as the number of light bulbs, the quality of the material used for the house or how well fed the children look, at the expense of discouraging systematically a diligent use of the modest resources poor households have.

A genuine citizen’s income would get rid of theses problems in one swoop, while extending support to low-paid formal sector workers. Of course, progress towards a full-fledged basic income must be gradual – for example through turning the existing means-tested Bolsa Família and the existing income tax exemption for dependent children into a universal child benefit system that would also benefit the working families that are neither poor enough to be entitled to welfare payments (about EUR 50 per capita per month) nor rich enough to pay tax (about EUR 400 per month). Nonetheless, the objective unambiguously stated in the law offers the promise of tackling effectively the criticisms the existing means-tested schemes are bound to trigger without feeling compelled to roll them back.

For these reasons, the signing of Senator Suplicy’s law proposal was an important, indeed incredible, moment in the history of Basic Income. We are no longer talking about Joseph Charlier or John Stuart Mill phrasing their interpretation of the Fourierist blueprint in the 1840s, nor even about the lone economists (and future Nobel laureates) Jan Tinbergen and James Meade trying in vain to convince their respective labour parties of the soundness of an unconditional Basic Income in the 1930’s. We are now talking about real laws. However, the path, the many paths are still long, often uphill, and the carriage is quite heavy. No time to waste. Let us press on.

Notes

1. This is a significantly edited and updated version of an address delivered at the closing plenary session of the 9th Congress of the Basic Income European Network (ILO, Geneva, September 2002).

2. Cf. website: www.uno-inkomen.org.

3. Cf. Myron Frankman: “Beyond the Tobin Tax: Global Democracy and a Global Currency”, in: The Annals, no. 581, 2002, pp. 62-73.

4. Cf. Joseph Huber: Vollgeld. Beschäftigung, Grundsicherung und weniger Staatsquote durch eine modernisierte Geldordnung. Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1998.

5. Cf. the informative analysis in: Case, Anne/Deaton, Angus: “Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa”, in: The Economic Journal. no. 108, 1998, pp. 1330-61.

6. Cf. Case, Anne: “Health, Income, and Economic Development”, Princeton University, Department of Economics, May 2001.

7. See above note 1.

8. Suplicy, Eduardo Matarazzo: Renda de Cidadania: A saida é pela porta. Sao Paulo: Cortez Editora, 2002.

9. Van Parijs, Philippe: Hacia una concepción de la justicia social global (ed. by Jorge Giraldo Ramírez). Medellín: Fundación Confiar, 2002.

10. With an average of 12 murders a day last year, Medellín credibly claims to be the most dangerous city in the world.

11. Basic Income on the Agenda, Amsterdam, 2000.

12. „Basic Income?“, in: Analyse & Kritik (special issue), Düsseldorf, 2000.

13. Den nya sociala fragan. Göteborg, 2001.

14. La Renta Básica. Barcelona, 2001.

15. What’s Wrong with a Free Lunch? Boston, 2001.

16. La Renta Básica en la agenda política. Buenos Aires, 2002.

17. Real Libertarianism Assessed. Basingstoke, 2003.

18. The Ethics of Stakeholding. Basingstoke, 2003.

19. “Redesigning Distribution: Basic Income and Stakeholder Grants as Cornerstones of a More Egalitarian Capitalism”, in: Politics & Society (ed. by Erik O. Wright; special issue), March 2004.

20. Promoting Income Security as a Right: Europe and North America. London, 2004.

Rückblick ohne Ostalgie. Musiker André Herzberg im Interview mit Leif Allendorf, 03.11.05

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André Herzberg, Jahrgang 1955, war als Sänger der DDR-Band „Pankow“ für eine Jugendgeneration von Ostdeutschen das, was im Westen Herbert Grönemeyer oder Marius Müller-Westernhagen waren. Nach der Wende war es still um das einstige Idol. 2005 sprach er erstmals über das Thema jüdische Identität in der DDR.

Was bedeutete jüdische Herkunft in der DDR? Gab es da eine bestimmte Erwartungshaltung der anderen?

Das wurde überhaupt nicht thematisiert. Es gab einen Status, den man von offizieller Seite Leuten zuerkannt hat, die in direkter Konfrontation zum Nazi-Regime gestanden hatten: entweder „Opfer des Faschismus“ oder „Kämpfer gegen den Faschismus“. Meine Mutter gehörte aufgrund ihrer frühen KPD-Mitgliedschaft zu der zweiten Gruppe, die höher angesehen wurde. Es gab in diesem Zusammenhang kleine Privilegien, eine Wohnung, Geld. So bekam ich bis zum Ende des Studiums einen monatlichen Zuschuss. Dass meine Eltern Juden waren, wurde dabei nicht angesprochen

Es gab also eine Gemeinsamkeit von Gegnern des Faschismus, es wurde kein Schisma gemacht zwischen jüdisch und kommunistisch?

Meine Tante, die Auschwitz überlebt hatte, hatte den etwas niedrigeren Status als Opfer des Faschismus, was ich absurd finde, da meine Mutter mit der Emigration ein vergleichsweise harmloses Schicksal hatte.

Wurde das Thema jüdische Herkunft im Freundes- und Bekanntenkreis zur Sprache gebracht?

Der Bekanntenkreis meiner Eltern bestand zum größten Teil aus jüdischen Immigranten. Es war ein familiärer Kreis, zu dem beispielsweise die Schriftstellerin Barbara Honigmann gehörte. Die Kinder verkehrten mit den anderen Immigrantenkindern. Ich gehörte schon nicht mehr richtig dazu, wohl aber meine älteren Geschwister.

Ihre Mutter hat sich stark mit dem Staat DDR identifiziert. Wie ist sie mit dem Thema jüdische Herkunft umgegangen?

Meine Mutter hat in traumatischer Weise über diese Dinge gesprochen. Sie erzählte, wie sie aus ihrer Wohnung geflüchtet ist und ihre Mutter zurückgelassen hat, wie sie nach Deutschland zurückgekehrt ist und die Mutter war tot. Aber all das nur in Andeutungen. Was Judentum ausmacht und jüdisches Leben, damit wollten meine Eltern nichts zu tun haben. Sie waren nicht religiös und sind als gute Kommunisten aus der jüdischen Gemeinde ausgetreten.

Wie stehen Sie selbst dazu? Hat jüdische Identität für Sie eine Relevanz?

Das ist ein ganz langer Prozess, von den Andeutungen über die Wahrnehmung der Andersartigkeit bis zum Abbröckeln des vorgegebenen Antifaschismus in der DDR. Während meiner Lehre in der NVA erlebte ich, dass die meisten kein Problem mit der Nazi-Zeit hatten und in dem Kriegsende keinen Bruch, sondern einen nahtlosen Untergang sahen. So wurde beispielsweise auf unserer Stube von den Soldaten heimlich Hitlers Geburtstag gefeiert.

Ein zynischer Scherz?

Das war eher nach dem Motto: Was verboten ist, macht uns gerade scharf. Das kam bei der Sauferei dann zum Vorschein. Für mich war das völlig verblüffend, weil es in völligem Widerspruch zu meiner Erziehung und dem Weltbild stand, mit dem ich aufgewachsen bin. Ich war entsetzt, habe das aber für mich behalten.

Ist die Militärzeit nicht generell eine Notsituation, die man zu überstehen versucht und erst später darüber nachdenkt?

Dieses Später hat bei mir sehr lange gedauert. In den Siebzigerjahren war der Staat Israel noch der zionistische Feind gewesen. In der letzten Phase der DDR wurde das Thema Israel etwas freundlicher behandelt. Ich hatte in erster Linie eine ablehnende Haltung gegen die Schule, gegen meine Eltern, gegen das Leben in der DDR. Irgendwann trug die jüdische Identität dazu bei, dass ich mich völlig als Außenstehender fühlte. Eine tiefere Beschäftigung damit kam aber erst nach der Wende.

Wie sah die aus?

Das ist ein noch nicht abgeschlossener Prozess. Ich habe Schwierigkeiten mit der jüdischen Identität. Das halte ich in Deutschland überhaupt für schwierig, wenn man sich nicht völlig religiös orientiert. Die jetzt bestehende jüdische Gemeinde wird im Osten von russischen Einwanderern dominiert, die weitgehend unter sich bleiben. Und die westdeutsche Gemeinde ist mir ebenfalls fremd, weil diese Menschen ebenfalls einen ganz anderen Lebenshintergrund haben als ich. Erst bei meinen Reisen nach Israel zu Verwandten dort in den Neunzigerjahren hat bei mir ein Nachdenken über die eigene Familie eingesetzt, und damit verbunden ein gewisser Normalitätsprozess. Vorher war das bei mir alles unter der Decke gewesen.

Wessen Initiative waren die Besuche in Israel? Die Ihrer Eltern?

Nein, meine eigene. Meine Eltern sind diesen Schritt nicht mitgegangen, sondern bei 1989 stehen geblieben. Mein Vater blockt das bis heute völlig ab. Er war kommunistischer Hardliner und hat diese Seite seiner Biografie ausgeblendet.

Welche Verwandten haben Sie in Israel besucht?

Verwandte meines Vaters, die mein Vater nie gesehen hat, die aber von uns wussten und mich sehr herzlich aufgenommen haben. Dass sie im Kibbuz leben, hat mir den Kontakt erleichtert. Die Kibbuzbewegung hat ja starke Ähnlichkeit mit der linken Bewegung des Sozialismus. Als ich dort ankam, kam mir das alles sehr vertraut vor. Es war wie im Osten, LPG, sozialistischer Großbetrieb, die blauen Arbeitsoveralls, die die Leute trugen, Wandbilder, die mich an Planerfüllung erinnerten. Nur mit dem wichtigen Unterschied, dass dort das Tor offen war, und nicht, wie in der DDR, verschlossen. Jeder kann kommen, und wer nicht bleiben will, kann gehen. Ich habe mich dort so wohl gefühlt, dass ich mit diesem Begriff jüdische Identität erstmals unbefangen umgehen konnte.

Sie sind ganz ohne Großeltern aufgewachsen?

Absolut. Meinen Großeltern väterlicherseits ist es gelungen, nach Amerika zu kommen. Von dort aus sind sie dem Bruder meines Vaters nach Südafrika gefolgt, wo sie mittlerweile verstorben sind. Ich habe sie nie gesehen, nur ein paar dürftige Zeilen bekommen, in einem Brief, den mein Großvater mir geschrieben hat. Daneben gab es in dieser Generation nur noch die Großmutter mütterlicherseits, die in Auschwitz umkam. Es ist also der totale Bruch in der Familie.

Ein Bruch, den die übrige Bevölkerung nicht hatte.

Da gibt es natürlich auch Einschnitte, Väter, die nicht aus dem Krieg zurückkehrten. Ich bin nicht der einzige, den das betrifft. In Familien beispielsweise, wo Angehörige in die Nazi-Diktatur involviert waren, dürfte das Schweigen ebenfalls verbreitet sein. Ich glaube allerdings, dass im Fall meiner Eltern, wo das Jüdischsein überhaupt nicht artikuliert wurde, das Sprechen darüber extrem schwierig ist.

Sie sind das jüngste von drei Kindern. Wie gehen Ihr Bruder und Ihre Schwester mit diesem Thema um?

Über den Kopf. In meiner Familie ist es typisch, mit so etwas sehr rational umzugehen. Mein Bruder hat sich geradezu wissenschaftlich mit dem Thema Judentum, Nazizeit und Überleben beschäftigt und hat Bücher zu dem Thema veröffentlicht. Das Gefühl bleibt auf diese Art meiner Ansicht nach außen vor.

Kennen Sie Menschen, die damit anders umgegangen sind?

Barbara Honigmann kommt aus ähnlichen Verhältnissen wie ich. Ihre jüdische Hochzeit in Ost-Berlin 1984, die ich miterlebt habe, hat große Aufmerksamkeit erregt. Sie ist dann nach Straßburg übergesiedelt, und ich hatte den Eindruck, dass hier jemand völlig unvermittelt von einer Identität in die andere springt. Es hat mich irritiert, dass sie sich in ihren darauf folgenden Büchern nur noch jüdisch definiert. Ich lebe mit einer gebrochenen Identität, ich fühle mich genauso als Deutscher wie als Jude.

Wir haben über Einschnitte gesprochen. Die Wende war sicher auch ein Einschnitt für den Musiker André Herzberg. Sie haben den Westen aber bereits vor 1989 kennen gelernt.

Ich durfte ab Mitte der Achtzigerjahre reisen. Ideologisch hat man sich abgeschottet. Aber es gab gleichzeitig Wirtschaftsinteressen, und die Band „Pankow“ war ein kleiner Wirtschaftsfaktor. Die wirtschaftlichen Interessen siegten, und sie ließen uns touren. Für mich war das ein Ventil. Auch wenn der Wahnsinn, die Verhältnisse, in denen ich in der DDR lebte, von außen betrachtet noch viel wahnsinniger erschien, ich konnte mich wie ein Engel auf beiden Seiten bewegen. Ich habe das genossen, aber auch gemerkt, wie wahnsinnig fremd und verloren ich mich im Westen fühlte und wie froh ich war, anschließend wieder in die heimische Höhle zu kriechen, wo ich mich auskannte.

Nun existiert die Höhle nicht mehr und der Westen ist zu Ihnen nach Prenzlauer Berggekommen. Fühlen Sie sich fremd und verloren?

Eine gewisse Fremdheit ist geblieben. Das hängt auch mit meiner beruflichen Situation zusammen. Das Publikum nimmt mich nach wie vor als Sänger der Gruppe „Pankow“ wahr. In diese Rolle werde ich – wie bei der jüngsten Ostalgie-Welle – immer wieder hineingedrängt.

Um aus Rolle herauszutreten haben Sie Ihr letztes Album als André Herzberg und nicht unter dem Etikett „Pankow“ herausgebracht. Außerdem sind Sie als Autor tätig. Mit Erfolg?

Ich verstehe mein Handwerk und ich weiß, was ich tue. Die Resonanz auf die Musik und das Buch ist gut, aber der kommerzielle Erfolg ist bislang ausgeblieben.

Sicherlich war es in einer Nischengesellschaft leichter, etwas bekannt zu machen, als im gegenwärtigen Überangebot.

Es mag auch daran liegen, dass das Thema DDR gerade nicht en vogue ist – es sei denn, im Rahmen von Ostalgie-Shows.

Über Wim Wenders ‚Don’t Come Knocking‘

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Antworten

Besprochen von Christoph Hermann

  • Don’t Come Knocking. Regie: Wim Wenders. Produktion: Deutschland/USA 2005. Laufzeit: 122 Min.

Der in die Jahre gekommene Cowboy Darsteller Howard Spence scheint plötzlich genug von seiner Karriere zu haben, mitten in einer Filmproduktion verlässt er in einer Drehpause das Set und reitet noch im Filmkostüm davon. Da er großer Filmstar ist, lässt er sich nicht ersetzen und seine Fahnenflucht bringt ein Geschäft in Gefahr, bei dem es um Millionen von Dollar geht. Deshalb lässt die Filmversicherung gleich einen ihrer Agenten einfliegen, der sich auf Howards Spur macht.

Diesen zieht’s heim zu Mami, die von Ihrem Sohn seit dreißig Jahren nichts gehört oder gesehen hat, außer durch die Zeitungen, denn die Sex-, Drogen- und Alkoholexzesse des Stars sind ausführlich in den Zeitungsausschnitten beschrieben, die seine Mutter fein säuberlich in einem Album aufbewahrt hat. Ganz verständnisvolle Mutter macht sie ihm keine Vorwürfe, dagegen teilt sie ihm mit, dass er seit zwanzig Jahren einen Sohn hat. Kellnerin Doreen war eine seiner zahllosen Affären, die er schon lange vergessen hat. Nun macht er sich auf, die zu suchen, die nie auf ihn gewartet haben.

Unverständliche Familienszenen

Mutter und Sohn sind die letzten zwanzig Jahre auch gut ohne den Zeugungsvater ausgekommen, sie ist von der Kellnerin zur Geschäftsführerin aufgestiegen, er ist Musiker und tritt bereits in ihrer Gaststätte auf. Daß der Sohn dem verlorenen Vater nicht sofort um den Hals fällt, ist nachvollziehbar. Warum er dann aber gleich den zutiefst Gekränkten markieren muss und in einem Wutanfall seine gesamte Zimmereinrichtung einschließlich Sofa aus dem Fenster wirft, bleibt unverständlich. Auch die Mutter macht dem Cowboy noch eine Szene. Unter Tränen wirft sie ihm vor, was für ein Feigling er sei, der sein ganzes Leben vor den Problemen nur davonlaufe. Das mag zwar stimmen, aber wieso das der reifen und unabhängigen Frau nach all den Jahren noch so nahe gehen soll, bleibt ebenfalls unbeantwortet. Wahrscheinlich müssen die beiden noch einmal Wut und Trauer markieren, weil sonst zu deutlich wäre, was Howard hier realistischerweise nur zu erwarten gehabt hätte: Gleichgültigkeit und Desinteresse.

Eine Nacht auf dem Sofa

Zu dem ganzen Familiendrama gesellt sich fast beiläufig noch eine junge Frau, die ständig mit einer übergroßen Urne mit der Asche ihrer jüngst verstorbenen Mutter im Arm durch die Szene läuft. Richtig geraten: der Cowboy hat auch eine Tochter gezeugt. Das muss man aber erraten, denn wer sie ist und warum sie dort auftaucht, scheint niemanden besonders zu interessieren, vielleicht sind Vater-Tochter Konflikte auch nicht so wichtig. Zumindest nicht so dramatisch, die Tochter randaliert nämlich nicht herum sondern sitzt mit ihrem Vater die ganze Nacht auf dem auf der Straße gelandeten Sofa und bietet Howard das an, was er wohl von seinem Sohn erhofft, nämlich Verständnis. Was dann am Morgen kommt ist nicht die Sperrmüllabfuhr sondern der Versicherungsagent, der dem Cowboy Handschellen anlegt um ihn wieder zum Filmset zurückzubringen, was niemand zu verhindern sucht, am wenigsten der entnervte Filmzuschauer.

Männer, die mit ihrem Altern und der Vaterrolle Probleme haben, gibt es sicher zuhauf. Darüber einen Film zu machen, ist nicht die schlechteste Idee. Schade, dass das Wim Wenders nur vorgetäuscht hat. Er wird doch nicht etwa schon zu alt sein?

Lesen Sie auch im AVINUS Magazin
„Die digitale Riesenchance“, Wim Wender im Gespräch mit Ronald Klein
Regisseur Wim Wenders spricht über sein Videodreh für die Band „Die Toten Hosen“, über seine Arbeit in den USA und das Klischee vom „Autorenfilm“. Thema ist außerdem die damals aktuelle Filmarbeit von Wenders, End of Violence.

Mit dem Blick fürs Ungewöhnliche. Regisseurin Tonie Marshall im Gespräch mit Caroline Elias und Thomas Weber, 12.08.05

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Im Rahmen der Reihe „Mit Frankreich am Set“ hatten Thomas Weber und Caroline Elias die Gelegenheit mit der französischen Regisseurin Tonie Marshall über die Filmszene in Frankreich und ihre eigenen Filme zu sprechen.

War es schwierig für Sie, die Finanzierung für Ihren ersten Film zu bekommen?

Nein, damit hatte ich ganz und gar keine Schwierigkeiten, denn er wurde von Produzent Charles Gassot finanziert, der damals gerade mit dem Film „Das Leben ist ein langer, ruhiger Fluss“ (La vie est un long fleuve tranquille) großen Erfolg gehabt hatte. Daher hatte er Kapital und bekam außerdem Referenzfilmförderung („fonds de soutien“ des CNC), so war mein Film leicht zu finanzieren, dennoch war er meiner Meinung nach zu teuer. Dafür hatte ich aber dann Probleme, das Geld für den zweiten Film zu finden.

Da waren Sie ja nicht allein, vielen Regisseuren geht es so.

Ja, in Frankreich ist der erste Film oft nicht so schwer zu finanzieren.

Wie kam die Finanzierung für „Pas très catholique“ am Ende doch zusammen?

In Frankreich muss man einen Produzenten finden, der gute Beziehungen zu Sendern, Verleihern und Filmfonds pflegt. Der Produzent hat den Film dann mit Canal+ und M6 koproduziert, außerdem gab es einen Vorschuss vom Verleih und Filmfonds-Geld, aber trotz der vielen Partner mussten wir mit sehr wenig Geld auskommen. Pas très catholique war eher ein Erfolg, und daher war es mit dem folgenden Film, Enfant de salaud, den wieder Gassot produziert hatte, einfacher. Der Film entstand als franko-belgische Koproduktion, denn wir hatten keine Möglichkeit in Paris auf einem sehr alten Friedhof zu drehen wie dem „Père Lachaise“. Wir entdeckten dann in Brüssel einen Friedhof, der ähnlich aussieht, so war es vorteilhaft, in Belgien die Hälfte des Films zu drehen, und wir haben auch ein sehr luxuriöses Haus dort gefunden, das in Paris sehr viel mehr gekostet hätte…

Der Film Pas très catholique ist auch heute noch sehr wichtig für Sie…

Ja, klar. Zunächst ist es so, dass ich diesen Film wirklich mag, wahrscheinlich ist es der Film, den ich am meisten mochte, es ist der, der mir am nächsten ist. Ich hatte gar nichts erwartet, und immer wenn man nichts erwartet, geschieht das Unerwartete. Ich wurde für die Berlinale ausgewählt, das war wunderbar. Und der Film lief gut in Frankreich, er lief gut in Deutschland.

Wie ist Ihr Verhältnis zur jungen Generation der Filmemacher der 90er Jahre, der „Génération Fémis“? Sind Sie da als Autodidaktin assoziiertes Mitglied?

Nein, aber es gibt diese Gruppe befreundeter Regisseure, und mit vielen von ihnen bin ich auch befreundet, z.B. mit Noémie Lvosky, Pascale Ferrand, Claire Denis und Nicole Gracia. Trotzdem: wir sind alle Individuen und das, was uns verbindet, ist, dass wir das Kino lieben und eine enge Beziehung zu ihm haben; Kino ist etwas Heiliges, das uns verbindet. Und darüber hinaus macht jeder von uns seine Filme, manchmal mögen wir die Filme der anderen nicht, aber das zerstört nicht das Verständnis, das wir füreinander aufbringen. Wir lieben das Kino mit Leidenschaft und wir respektieren uns aufgrund dieser Leidenschaft für das Kino.

Was ist ihre Haltung gegenüber der anderen großen Kinogeneration, der „Nouvelle Vague“?

Oh, mon Dieu! Ich verorte mich nur ungern innerhalb einer historischen Perspektive. Da bin ich diskreter, ich weiß nicht, wie man das beschreiben kann, aber ich sage nicht, ich „realisiere ein Werk“, ich mache die Filme, die ich machen möchte und die ich machen kann. Was die „Nouvelle Vague“ betrifft, nun, da denke ich an Filme von Godard oder Truffaut, Baisers volés zum Beispiel. Auch wenn er nicht der größte Film von Truffaut ist, so hat er mich doch stark inspiriert. Ich liebe auch Une femme est une femme. Die Unbeugsamkeit und die Energie dieser Generation hat der Generation danach viel gegeben …

Gehören Sie also einer Art „Nouvelle nouvelle vague“ an?

Nein, ich glaube nicht, dass die heutige Generation von Filmemachern etwas mit der Idee der „Nouvelle Vague“ zu tun hat. Damals entstand sie aus dem Bruch mit dem herrschenden Akademismus heraus, mit der überlieferten Art, Filme zu machen. Ich persönlich musste mich von gar nichts abgrenzen, denn den Bruch haben ja andere vor mir gemacht. Das ist wie mit den Nachgeborenen der „Résistance“… Sie werden mich also nicht sagen hören, ich sei im Widerstand gegen irgendetwas, das habe ich nicht nötig, das haben andere erledigt. Natürlich, ich bin Nutznießerin der Geschichte, von dem, was gut oder schlecht in ihr war. Aber all das, was heute den Filmmarkt bestimmt, die Digitalisierung, das Internet, diese Schnelligkeit sind Veränderungen, die nicht mit der Nouvelle Vague zu erklären sind. Das hat einfach mit der Zeit zu tun, in der wir leben. Wir drehen Filme über die Themen, die uns interessieren. Aber die Schnelllebigkeit erlaubt es vielen Filmen nicht mehr, sich im Kino zu beweisen, dabei wissen wir, dass sich diese Filme so lange wie möglich im Kino halten müssen, um überhaupt wahrgenommen zu werden, was angesichts des Überangebots oft gar nicht mehr klappt, so dass viele Filme in der Masse untergehen.

Welche ist die störungsanfälligste Etappe der Filmherstellung?

Es gibt immer Probleme in den verschiedenen Phasen, in denen ein Film entsteht – während des Schreibprozesses, während der Dreharbeiten, beim Kinostart, da kann viel danebengehen. Aber ich habe viel gelernt als Schauspielerin, als Scriptgirl usw., und das war dann sehr nützlich bei meiner Arbeit als Produzentin für Arte. Da war die Funktion des „künstlerischen Produzenten“ zu besetzen, also jemand, der von Abteilung zu Abteilung flitzt, angefangen beim Drehbuch über Kostüme, Licht und Technik, und der einigermaßen weiß, welche Informationen ergänzt werden müssen. Und da ich mit Schauspielern genauso wie mit der Lichtabteilung oder dem Produktionsbüro umgehen kann, war das schon sehr praktisch. Ich komme mir deswegen nicht mehr wie eine kleine einsame Person vor, die völlig alleingelassen Filme dreht. Ich stelle mir nicht einmal mehr diese Frage, denn ich weiß, ich habe die Fähigkeit und das Wissen, mit Schauspielern zu arbeiten, oder auch wie die Dreharbeiten beschleunigt, wie man 26 Minuten in dreieinhalb Tagen dreht und welche Drehkapazität man dafür benötigt.

Es gibt Leute, die sagen, Sie haben eine weibliche Art Filme zu drehen. Die neunziger Jahre waren ein sehr frauendominiertes Jahrzehnt im französischen Kino. Es gab viele Frauen, die plötzlich ihre Filme machten oder die als Schauspielerin und Regisseurin hervortraten wie z.B. Valeria Bruni Tedeschi

Die wirklich Erste, die zu unserer Generation gehört, war die Schauspielerin und Regisseurin Christine Pascale, die auch mit ihrem Produzenten verheiratet war. Sie hat sich vor einigen Jahren umgebracht. Sie hatte eine kompromisslose Beziehung zum Kino. In Frankreich gab es anschließend viele Frauen, denen es plötzlich möglich war, Filme zu drehen. Als Regisseurin komme ich in der Welt viel herum und nirgendwo sonst gibt es so viele Regisseurinnen wie in Frankreich. Frauen werden so stark gefördert, dass die Männer manchmal das Gefühl haben, es gäbe eine Art von positiver Diskriminierung.

Heute gibt es nicht wenige Schauspielerinnen, die ins Regiefach wechseln. Wenn man als Zuschauer das Kino liebt, Schauspieler ist und dazu auch noch schreiben kann, ergibt sich dies zwangsläufig.

Warum, glauben Sie, sind es trotzdem so viele Frauen?

Nun, ich weiß es nicht. Vielleicht weil plötzlich die Produzenten und Finanziers die Frauen entdeckten, die erfolgreich waren wie z.B. Coline Serreau mit Trois hommes et un couffin (Drei Männer und ein Baby) mit 10 Mio. Eintritte in Frankreich.Nun gab es von einem auf den anderen Moment die Idee, dass Frauen Kino machen können, aber trotzdem hat man nie bemerkt, dass es nun außerordentlich weibliches Kino sei. Man könnte sagen, dass die neunziger Jahre sich dadurch auszeichneten, dass die Frauen plötzlich sehr viel direkter, deutlicher und differenzierter über Sexualität sprachen. Da sie selbst Frauen sind, gab es vielleicht eine andere Vertrauensbasis, auf der sie sich berechtigt fühlten, den Körper einer Schauspielerin zu benutzen, dass sie weiter gingen, sehr viel weiter gingen als die Männer, die, so könnte man sagen, immer noch die Klischees reproduzierten. Und das hat wahrscheinlich in besonderer Weise die Produzenten interessiert und die Fernsehkanäle. Heute gibt es in Frankreich fast genauso viele Regisseurinnen wie Regisseure.

Worin liegt für Sie der Grund zu dieser Veränderung des Kinos gerade in den neunziger Jahren?

Nun, das war eine Zeit, in der Canal+ begann, sich sehr für das Kino zu engagieren und Filme zu finanzieren und das hat vielen erlaubt, ihre Filme zu drehen; oft waren es die ersten Filme. Und wenn man die erste Finanzierungszusage hatte, war es nicht so schwer, weitere zu finden und dann gab es diesen Sog des Neuen. Denn das Neue steht immer für das Lebendige, das sich bewegt und etwas wagt. Das hat Lust auf mehr gemacht. Ich profitierte von dem, was Christine Pascale, Josiane Balasko und andere schon gemacht hatten, und ich fand einen Produzenten. Hätte ich den nicht gefunden, wäre ich da geblieben, wo ich war. (Charles Gassot war zunächst als Werbefilmproduzent sehr erfolgreich gewesen und hatte daher eine andere Beziehung zum Risiko.)

Wie verhält sich Canal+ heute?

Es gibt ein Überangebot an Filmen, was die Verwertungskette verändert. Ein Kinostart ist ziemlich teuer, die Filme halten sich nicht mehr so lange im Kino. Früher war die Ausstrahlung auf Canal+ kurz nach dem Kinostart, heute schieben sich Piraterie und DVD-Ver­öf­fent­lichung dazwischen. Die Filme sind nicht mehr taufrisch, wenn sie auf Canal+ zu sehen sind. Vor ein paar Jahren war das Fernsehen eine Möglichkeit, nach dem Filmstart noch im Gespräch zu bleiben, und heute kommt der Film oft gleich ins Fernsehen. Das hat die Reihenfolge der Finanzierung der Filme extrem verändert.

Wenn Sie die Filme betrachten, die in diesem Jahr schon angelaufen sind, dann bemerken sie, dass diese eher schlicht, sehr teuer und stark inspiriert vom Fernsehen sind, für das breite Publikum. Das hat viel verändert und Canal+ folgt diesem Trend. Es gibt eben nicht mehr die Produzenten wie Humbert Balsan oder Gilles Sandoz, und Pierre Chevalier hat Arte-cinema verlassen. Und Arte versucht insgesamt, ein größeres Publikum zu gewinnen, was zu einem Wettbewerb führt, der darauf ausgerichtet ist, die kurze Zeit der Auswertung möglichst profitabel zu nutzen. Der Kinostart ist nur die Werbephase für die DVD, die erst das Geld bringt. Der Film läuft vier bis sechs Wochen im Kino, und die DVD wird schnell nachgeschoben, um die Piraterie zu begrenzen.

In ihren Filmen spielen Frauen eine wichtige Rolle. Verweist das auf eine bestimmte Art von Feminismus?

Nein, ganz und gar nicht. Ich schreibe Rollen für Schauspielerinnen, mit denen ich gerne arbeiten möchte. Ich stelle mir diese Frage nicht.

Sie haben sehr starke Frauenfiguren in ihren Filmen…

In Pas très catholique ist es eine Figur, die sehr früh ihr Kind verlassen hat und ich habe ihr nie die Schuld dafür gegeben. Ich lasse das Bedauern darüber zu, aber keine Schuld. Das ist etwas ganz anderes. Die Figur fühlt sich berechtigt, ein Leben zu leben, das nicht unmittelbar den gesellschaftlichen Ansprüchen genügt, ohne sich dabei permanent schuldig zu fühlen, und trotzdem mit dem Schmerz, den so eine Entscheidung mit sich bringt, leben zu lernen. Denn für alles zahlen wir einen Preis. Die Filme, die ich mache, sind Komödien, die erzählen, dass das Leben hart ist.

Vielen Dank!

Das Gespräch führten Caroline Elias und Dr. Thomas Weber am 11.05.05 in Babelsberg im Rahmen der Reihe „Mit Frankreich am Set”. Dank an HFF, Institut Français, Mediaoffice und das MAE. Übersetzung: Dörte Richter